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INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM OR AUTONOMY
GROUNDED UPON THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A
JURISPRUDENTIAL MIRAGE
Richard H. Hiersl
Abstract:
In recent decades, several federal judges and Supreme Court
Justices have stated that, at some time or another in the past,
the Court determined that public universities or their
professional schools are entitled to institutional academic
freedom (or institutional autonomy) under the First
Amendment. Notwithstanding the views of many learned
commentators, the Court has never so held. Concurring
opinions and dicta do not constitute Constitutional law. This
article traces the series of misattributions, misreadings and
other errors that have contributed to the present peculiar
state of confusion in regard to these matters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Up until 1978 no one had suggested that academic institutions might
be entitled to academic freedom (sometimes confused with "autonomy")
under the First Amendment. In that year, one Supreme Court Justice, in a
solo opinion, 23proposed that such institutions were, somehow, so entitled.3
Since then, and on the basis of that 1978 solo opinion, several other Supreme
Court Justices, federal appellate judges, and commentators have come to
assume that the Court has held that the First Amendment protects the
"academic freedom" (or "autonomy") at least of public universities or their
I

Related articles by the present writer include: Academic Freedom in Public

Colleges and Universities: 0 Say Does that Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet

Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1993); New Restrictions on Academic Free Speech: Jeffries v.
Harleston, 22 J.C. & U.L. 217 (1995); InstitutionalAcademic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic
Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. & U.L. 35
(2002); and Institutional Academic Freedom - A ConstitutionalMisconception: Did Grutter

v. Bollinger Perpetuatethe Confusion?, 30 J.C. & U.L. 531 (2004).
The writer wishes to thank J. Peter Byrne, John LaNear, David M. Rabban, and
Jeffrey C. Sun for their gracious and helpful presentations and suggestions at a panel session
of the American Education Research Association focused on "Individual vs. Institutional
Academic Freedom" in San Francisco, April, 2006. Errors in the present article, whether
minor or egregious, are solely the writer's own.
2 See infra note 59 and accompanying text. Throughout this article the sections of
Justice Powell's Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke opinion, in which no other justices
joined, will be referred to as a solo opinion.
3 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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professional schools. In short,4 that there is such a thing as constitutional
institutional academic freedom.
Commentators have written numerous scholarly law journal articles
on the subject of "institutional academic freedom." Some have advocated
constitutional protection for such freedom as a bulwark against external (for
instance, legislative) encroachments upon individual faculty academic
freedom. 5 Others have advocated First Amendment institutional academic
freedom as a way of ensuring colleges' or universities' authority to develop
and maintain affirmative action programs or student body diversity.6 On the
other hand, a few commentators have warned that institutional academic
freedom could be invoked by college or university administrations - or by
courts on their behalf - in order to trump or over-ride First Amendment
academic freedom claims by individual faculty.7 Both the Fourth and the
Seventh Circuits have, in fact, done just that.8
The present article does not argue either for or against the benefits or
perils of institutional academic freedom. Instead, it observes that the
Supreme Court has never actually held that academic institutions are entitled
to either academic freedom or autonomy under the First Amendment. 9
Language cited in support of the proposition that the Court has so held can
be found only in concurring opinions and dicta.'0 Nevertheless, the notion of
constitutional institutional academic freedom or autonomy has taken on a life
of its own - wholly apart from any constitutional roots or foundation.
Advocates of various causes and concerns have invoked its authority to add
weight to their arguments." But it is an illusion, a fantasy, a mirage. How
did this strange jurisprudence come about?
It came about through what might be considered a parade, if not
comedy, of errors. Some errors were relatively minor, such as misattributing
quoted sources. Others were more fundamental - and more persistent - such
as failing to distinguish between concurring opinions or dicta and Court
holdings, misrepresenting the substance of previous opinions, and
interpolating new language into purported quotations from prior authority.
There seems to be something about the topic that inspires impressionistic and
mistaken, if not intentionally misleading readings and interpretations. This
4

5
6

See infra notes 112-354 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 201-354 and accompanying text.
See generally Leland Ware, Strict Scrutiny, Affirmative Action, and Academic

Freedom: The University of Michigan Cases, 78 TUE. L. REv. 2097 (2004) (urging
institutional academic freedom as a basis for defending affirmative action and student
diversity).
7 See generally Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom vs. Faculty
Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. &
U.L. 35 (2002).
8 See infra notes 153-164, 241-266, 300-306 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 43-111 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 112-354 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 112-354 and accompanying text.

2007]

INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

5

article will describe the principal mistakes, misreadings and
misinterpretations that have culminated in the notion that the Supreme Court
has, at one time or other, held that academic institutions themselves
enjoy a
12
First Amendment right to academic freedom or autonomy.
Most, if not all, of the fundamental errors derive from certain
portions of Justice Powell's solo opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke. 13 There, Justice Powell undertook to extract the idea
that universities themselves are entitled to certain "freedoms" -- which he
characterized as "academic freedom" -- under the First Amendment from his
own amalgam of sources. 14 These sources consisted of language quoted in
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, language
from the Court's opinion in Regents of State University of New York v.
Keyishian, and Justice Powell's own interpolations and commentary in
Bakke. 5
In order to trace the history of subsequent developments, this article
begins by describing both Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence and the
Court's holding in Keyishian.16 Careful attention will be given in Part H to
what Justice Frankfurter (and the source he quoted) actually said, and to the
fact that his was a concurring opinion.1 7 The language and substance
of the
18
Court's Keyishian opinion will be examined closely in Part H.
As will be shown, all relevant misreadings and misrepresentations of
both Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence and the Court's holding in
Keyishian took place only in the years following publication of Justice
Powell's Bakke solo opinion in 1978.
All such misreadings and
misrepresentations evidently were influenced by that opinion. Part IV of
this article, therefore, describes and analyzes Justice Powell's solo opinion,
attending particularly to his legal reasoning. 19
In order to keep track of the influence Justice Powell's Bakke solo
opinion had on subsequent case law, the errors it gave rise to will be
examined in Part V as follows. First, this section will examine errors with
respect to the reading and interpretation of Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence. 20
Second, this section considers errors in reading and
representing what the Court said in Keyishian.2 1 And to close, Part V of this
article discusses errors in reporting the substance and significance of Justice
Powell's Bakke solo opinion, itself. 22 In some cases, such errors over-lap;

13

See infra notes 112-354 and accompanying text.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

14

Id. at 311-312.

12

15 See infra notes 43-111 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 63-111 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 123-176 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 178-200 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 201-352 and accompanying text.
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for example, both Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence and Keyishian
are sometimes misrepresented in the same discussion. In such instances,
these errors will be noted in appropriate separate subsections of this article.23
In many cases, error begets error, to the extent that something in the nature
of a family tree or genealogy of error can be identified. It will be shown that
subsequent Supreme Court concurrences and dicta occasionally find their
place in such genealogies.
II. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER'S CONCURRENCE IN SWEEZY V.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court addressed certain
issues arising out of Paul M. Sweezy's refusal to answer some questions put
to him by the State's Attorney General pursuant to statutory authority. 24 Mr.
Sweezy declined to answer these questions on constitutional grounds.25 The
questions concerned the contents of an invited lecture he had given at the
University, as well as, the political associations and activities of certain
persons with whom he was acquainted.26 After Sweezy again refused to
answer these questions, this time as a witness in court, he was held in
contempt and ordered committed to the county jail.27 The state supreme
court upheld the conviction.28
The Court's plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren,
stated that the conviction should be reversed because Mr. Sweezy's First
Amendment rights and liberties "in the areas of academic freedom and
political expression" had been violated.29 Such a violation offended the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause inasmuch as "the Attorney
General's interrogation of [Sweezy was] wholly unrelated to the object[ive]
of the legislature in authorizing the inquiry ....
See infra notes 201-352 and accompanying text.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
25 Id. at 239-42 n.6.
23

24

26
27

28
29

30

Id. at 234-44.
Id. at 244-45
Id. at 245.
Id. at 250.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 254-55. The Fourth Circuit has contended that the Sweezy

plurality's decision did not implicate the First Amendment: "[T]he plurality did not vacate
Sweezy's contempt conviction on First Amendment grounds, but rather concluded that
because the Attorney General lacked authority to investi.ate Sweezy, the conviction violated
due process." Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4 Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Urofsky
court apparently ignored the plurality's explicit language on point:
The State Supreme Court thus conceded without extended discussion that
petitioner's right to lecture and his right to associate with others were
constitutionally protected freedoms which had been abridged through this
investigation. These conclusions could not be seriously debated. Merely
to summon a witness and compel him, against his will, to disclose the
nature of his past expressions and associations is a measure of
governmental interference in these matters. These are rights which are
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Justice Frankfurter's concurrence was joined by Justice Harlan.3'
Here Justice Frankfurter reviewed certain policy considerations that militate
against "governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university,"
most notably, perhaps, "the dependence of a free society on free
universities. 32 In support of these public policy considerations, Justice
Frankfurter cited from among "the testimony of a cloud of impressive
witnesses," an address by T. H. Huxley, a statement by Harvard President A.
Lawrence Lowell, certain British University Grants Committee reports, and
the "latest expression on this subject," The Open Universities In South
Africa, a book written in 1957 by scholars at two South African universities
in opposition to that nation's government's proposed Apartheid program,
which would bar non-whites from admission to these institutions as
students.33
Language from the book quoted by Justice Frankfurter included the
following:
'A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its
ideal being the ideal of Socrates - 'to follow the argument
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. We
believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties
in the areas of academic freedom and political expression - areas in which
government should be extremely reticent to tread.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249-50. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not
function in a vacuum. This Amendment's language reads in relevant part: "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. AmEND. XIV § 1. The issue before the Sweezy Court was whether Mr. Sweezy had
been deprived of liberty -- viz., his First Amendment rights -- without due process of law.
The Sweezy plurality found that he had been so deprived:
Our conclusion does rest upon a separation of the power of a
state legislature to conduct investigations from the responsibility to direct
the use of that power insofar as that separation causes a deprivation of
the constitutionalrights of individuals and a denialof due process of law.
354 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 255-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result, joined by Harlan, J.).
32 Id. at 261, 262; see also id. at 261-64. For purposes of the present study, it is
not necessary to consider Justice Frankfurter's analysis of the State's intrusions upon Mr.
Sweezy's political rights, other than to note (1) his precise terms in the following statement:
"In the political realm, as in the academic, thought and action are presumptively immune from
inquisition by political authority," id. at 266; and (2) that Justice Frankfurter found, but only
implicitly, that the State had violated Mr. Sweezy's First Amendment political rights, viz., "so
basic a liberty as his political autonomy," or his "right [as] a citizen to political privacy, as
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment .... " Id. at 265, 266-67. Justice Frankfurter did not
refer specifically to the First Amendment.
13

CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN AND THE

(Albert
van de Sandt Centlivres et al. eds., Johannesburg: Witwatersrand Univ. Press, 1957)
[hereinafter OPEN UNIVERSITIES].
As to the book and its South African context, see Richard H. Hiers, Institutional
Academic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A
Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J. C. & U. L. 35, 45-55 (2002).
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SouTH AFRICA 262
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where it leads.' This implies the right to examine, question,
modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and
hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an
immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university.
The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise
facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever
examining and modifying the framework itself.'
'Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis
of observation and experiment are the necessary conditions
for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A sense of
freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts
which, equally with scientific research, is the concern of the
university.'
'*

* * It is the business of a university to provide that

atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university - to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.' The Open Universities in South Africa
10-12. (A statement of a conference of senior scholars from
the University of Cape Town and the University of The
Witwatersrand, including A. v. d. S. Centlivres and Richard
34
Feetham, as Chancellors of the respective universities.)
This language, especially the third quoted paragraph, has figured
prominently in subsequent judicial discussions, most notably, beginning in
1981 .3 This language was to become the basis for the latter-day notion that
colleges and universities are entitled to academic freedom or autonomy
under the First Amendment. As will be shown, this South African language
came to function, to borrow Justice Holmes characterization of federal
common law, as "a brooding omnipresence in the sky,"36 somehow
(supposedly) furnishing quasi-, if not super-constitutional authority for the
idea of institutional academic freedom.3 7
34 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result) (quoting OPEN UNIVERSITIES, supra note 33, at 11-12) (internal
punctuation omitted). The sentence quoted internally, "It is an atmosphere ... admitted to
study," is there attributed to an address by Dr. T. B. Davie reported in The Cape Times, Feb.
28, 1953. OPEN UNIvERsITmEs, supra note 33, at 12 n.10.
3- See infra notes 112-354 and accompanying text (explaining how subsequent
opinions have based their holdings on Justice Frankfurter's use of The Open Universities
language.
36 S.Pac. Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37 See infra notes 123-157 and accompanying text.
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Necessarily, these South African scholars were not proposing to
ground their concerns upon the First Amendment or other United States
constitutional premises. In The Open Universities, the authors were arguing
in favor of university autonomy and faculty academic freedom as important
social policy values.38 There was no reference to the U.S. Constitution.3 9
Nor did Justice Frankfurter, himself, undertake to ground the portion
of his concurrence regarding either Sweezy's lecture or "the intellectual life
of a university" 40 upon the First Amendment. Justice Frankfurter invoked
the First Amendment only indirectly or implicitly, and then only in his
discussion of "political activity" or "the right of a citizen to political
privacy." 4241 His concurrence makes no mention at all of "academic
freedom.,

III. KEYISHIAN V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF
43
THE STATE OF NEW YORK
In this case, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a network of
New York State laws and regulations that restricted teachers' rights of
speech and association. 44 These laws and regulations provided that teachers
who advocated certain types of activity or belonged to various "subversive"
organizations were disqualified for appointment to, or retention in, the
State's schools. 45 A three-judge federal court upheld the network as
constitutional, and the Supreme Court, noting probable jurisdiction, heard the

38 See Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom - A Constitutional
Misconception: Did Grutter v. Bollinger Perpetuatethe Confusion, 30 J. C. & U. L. 531, 533-

35 (2004). See also Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom 61 TEX. L.
REv. 817, 843 (1983):

[The Open Universities] made clear that a breach in the wall of
institutional autonomy may impair academic freedom even though no
individual scholar can be shown to have been threatened for what he
teaches or publishes. In other words, although [The Open Universities]
conceived of academic freedom and institutional autonomy as separate
ideas, it emphasized the manner in which they may be intimately
connected.
Id.
'9

OPEN UNIVERSITIES,

supra note 33.

40 He used this expression twice: Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 26162 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 255-67.
43 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The State University of New
York at Buffalo was not a party to the suit. The question before the Keyishian Court was the

constitutionality of the state laws and regulations. The State Board of Regents was involved
because the challenged laws required the Board to promulgate rules and regulations, and to
take various administrative actions to enforce them.
44 Id. at609-10.
41

Id. at 593-602.
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case on appeal.46 Appellants were members of the faculty of the University
of Buffalo, which was a state university at the time the action arose.4 7
The Court held various sections of the challenged laws
impermissibly vague and overbroad, and, therefore, in violation of the
appellant teachers' First Amendment rights.4a Because Keyishian has often
been cited in recent years as authority for purported First Amendment rights
of universities, the Court's holdings and related language are quoted here in
full. As to appellants' First Amendment speech rights, the Court reasoned
and held as follows:
We emphasize once again that precision of regulation must
be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms, for standards of permissible statutory
vagueness are strict in the area of free expression. Because
the First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity. New York's complicated and intricate
scheme plainly violates that standard. When one must guess
what conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one
necessarily will steer far wider of the unlawful zone. For the
threat of sanctions may deter almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions. The danger of that chilling effect
upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be
guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform
teachers what is being proscribed.
The regulatory maze created by New York is wholly lacking
in terms susceptible of objective measurement.
Vagueness of wording is aggravated by prolixity and
profusion of statutes, regulations, and administrative
machinery ....
We therefore hold that [§] 3021 of the Education Law and
subdivisions l(a), l(b) and 3 of sect. 105 of the Civil Service
Law as implemented by the machinery created pursuant to
[§] 3022 of the Education Law are unconstitutional.49
The Court found that the New York laws and regulations also violated
appellants' First Amendment right of association:

46 Id. at 592-93.
41 Id. at 591-92.
48 Id. at 604, 609-10.
49 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603-04 (internal citations and punctuation omitted).
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[Certain sections of these provisions] seek to bar
employment both for association which legitimately may be
proscribed and for association which may not be proscribed
consistently with First Amendment rights. Where statutes
have an overbroad sweep, just as where they are vague, the
hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious
rights may be critical, since those covered by the statute are
to limit their behavior to that which is unquestionably
bound
50
safe.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, includes two
emphatic statements regarding the importance or value of teachers' academic
freedom as a matter of national concern and national interest.51 In the first,
the Court stated:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore
a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
The vigilant protection of constitutional
classroom.
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
The classroom is peculiarly the
American schools.
"marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude
of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.52
Justice Brennan's opinion went on, quoting at some length from the Sweezy
Court's plurality opinion:
'The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
No one should
universities is almost self-evident.
underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field
of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that
new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true
in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
50

Id. at 609 (citations omitted).

"52 Id.
603. (internal
Id. at
at 603

citations omnitted) (brackets in original).
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accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our
53
die.'
and
stagnate
will
civilization
The Court clearly understood that academic freedom - the freedom of
"teachers", "those who guide and train our youth", "the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities" - was grounded upon the First Amendment,
and that such First Amendment freedoms were violated by the statutes and
regulations before the Court.54
Faculty or teachers' academic freedom was clearly one of the "vital
First Amendment rights" the Court referred to here. The Court did not even
discuss the possibility that the University itself might be entitled to academic
freedom under the First Amendment. There was no such issue in the case,
and the Court did not rule on it.55 In all of its discussion of academic
freedom, the Keyishian Court made no mention of Justice Frankfurter's
Sweezy concurrence or The Open Universities language quoted in it.5 6 Until
1978, no court or commentator had yet suggested that public colleges or
universities themselves might be entitled to either academic freedom or
institutional autonomy under the First Amendment. 57 That first suggestion later to be regarded by many as gospel - came in the form of Justice Powell's
solo opinion in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke.58
IV. JUSTICE POWELL SOLO OPINION IN BAKKE 5 9
Mr. Allan Bakke, a white male applicant, was denied admission to
the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, even though the
53

Id. at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).

54

Id.

See Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589. More than ten years would elapse before anyone
suggested that Keyishian had anything to do with the academic freedom of universities.
56
Id.
57 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
58 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978).
59 No other Justice joined parts IV-D or V-A of Justice Powell's opinion. These
parts are found at Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-19. Justice Powell's discussion of academic
freedom and the First Amendment is confined to these subsections of his opinion. The only
portions of Justice Powell's opinion that were joined by four other Justices were Parts I and
V-C. See id. at 272, 329. Justice White joined part III-A. Id. Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part. Id. at 324-79. Justice Stevens, joined by Burger, C.J. and Stewart and
Rehnquist, JJ., likewise wrote another separate opinion, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part. Id. at 408-21. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun each also wrote
their own separate opinions. Id. at 379-409. Designating parts IV-D and V-A of Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion as his "solo opinion" avoids any need to determine whether it would
be better characterized as "dissenting" or "concurring."
55

INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

2007]

School had admitted several minority students with lower test scores under a
special admissions program. 6° The admissions program had been devised by
the Medical School's faculty, and was administered by committees
composed of faculty, students, and administrators. 6' The California Supreme
Court held that the School's special admissions program was unlawful,
enjoined the school's consideration of race when making future admissions
decisions, and directed the trial court to order Mr. Bakke admitted.6 2
Justice Powell considered that the medical school's special
admissions program violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
requirement, and concluded that the portion of the California Supreme
Court's judgment invalidating that program should be upheld.6 3 Four other
Justices agreed in that result on the ground that the medical school's special
admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1 9 6 4 .64 The
other four Justices, writing separately, agreed with Justice Powell in
reversing the California Supreme Court's judgment that race could never be
considered a factor in admissions policy. 65 Part IV.D. of Justice Powell's

opinion discussed academic freedom and the First Amendment, 66 and Part
V.A. referred, albeit obliquely, to the First Amendment.67 Neither of these
parts was joined by any other Justices, nor did either of the two groups of
Justices writing separately even mention either academic freedom or the First
Amendment.
No judge, Justice or commentator prior to Bakke had ever suggested
that the Supreme Court had held that public colleges or universities might be
entitled to academic freedom or autonomy under the First Amendment.
Subsequent proposals to the effect that such institutions are so entitled all
derive directly or indirectly from Justice Powell's solo opinion in Bakke,
from Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence, and/or from Keyishian, when
misread in light of Justice Powell's solo opinion in Bakke. 68 It is important,
therefore, to examine closely what Justice Powell said, and to assess its
accuracy.

A. The Language of Justice Powel's Bakke Solo Opinion
Relevant language from that solo opinion is quoted below. Numbers
inserted in brackets immediately after certain sentences mark statements that
are examined in the analysis that follows. Justice Powell the following:

60

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-77.
272-77.
270-71.
320.

61 Id. at
62 Id. at
63 Id. at

64 Id. at 271, 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 272, 324-79 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
Id. at 315-19; see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
68 See infra part V. of this article.
66
67
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The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a
diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education. [1.]
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment. [2.] The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body. [3.] Mr. Justice
Frankfurter summarized the "four essential freedoms" that
constitute academic freedom: [4., 5.]
'It is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university - to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.' " Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 263. (1957) (concurring in result). [6.]
Our national commitment to the safeguarding of these
freedoms within university communities was emphasized in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967):
[7.]
"Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore
a special concern of the First Amendment .... The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out
of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.' United States v. Associated Press,
D.C., 52 F.Supp. 362, 372." [8.]
The atmosphere of "speculation, experiment and creation" so essential to the quality of higher education - is widely
believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. [9.] As
the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that
the "nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure" to the ideas and mores of students as diverse
as this Nation of many peoples. 69 [10.]

69

Bakke, 438 U.S. at311-13.
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Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the
right to select those students who will contribute the most to
the "robust exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes a
countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First
Amendment. [11., 12.] In this light, petitioner must be
viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.7 0 [13.]
By juxtaposing these quotations and citations and adding his own
interpretive glosses, Justice Powell was trying to show that universities are
entitled to academic freedom under the First Amendment, defined in terms of
the "four essential freedoms" language quoted in Justice Frankfurter's
Sweezy concurrence.71
In particular, Justice Powell wished to credit
universities with a constitutionally guaranteed right to select students who
would contribute to "the robust exchange of ideas." 72
B. Analysis and Critique
Justice Powell's reasoning prompts a number of questions and
comments. These are considered in the sequence indicated by the numbers
inserted above in brackets.
[1.] Justice Powell's statement that it "clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education" to seek "the
attainment of a diverse student body, ''73 seems incontrovertible, even though
it is unsupported by citation to authority. Arguably any goal not prohibited
by the Constitution may be presumed to be constitutionally permissible. The
issue in Bakke, however, was whether the means for attaining that goal were
constitutionally permissible.74 Rather than begging this question, Justice
Powell probably meant only to introduce the argument that followed.
[2.] The proposition that academic freedom is "a special concern of
the First Amendment," though set out without quotation marks or attribution,
derives from Keyishian.7 5 Keyishian had to do with teachers' academic
freedom, a point Justice Powell left unmentioned. 76
[3.] As if it somehow followed, Justice Powell then declared - ipse
dixit - without citing authority that "[t]he freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student

Id. at 314.
Id. at 312; supra note 34 and accompanying text.
72 Id. at 313; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73 Id. at 311-12; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74 Id. at 269-71, 287-311.
75 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
f See supra notes 49, 50, and 53 and accompanying text.
70

71

16
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body." 7
Keyishian, of course, said nothing about "the freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education" or about a university's
selection of its student body; nor did it characterize any university's
freedoms as First Amendment rights.7 8 It may be noted that Justice Powell's
statement that a university has "the freedom... to make its own judgment as
to education" is much broader than the "four essential freedoms" enumerated
in Justice Frankfurter's quotation from The Open Universities.79
[4.] In order to validate this declaration, Justice Powell then turned
to Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy. 8°
He characterized the
language Justice Frankfurter had quoted from The Open Universities as if
Justice Frankfurter himself had summarized the four essential freedoms.8'
Justice Powell did not note that the quoted language came from The Open
Universities book, nor did he explain how language from a South African
context could
possibly serve as authoritative construction of the U.S.
82
Constitution.
[5.] Again, writing ipse dixit, without further explanation or
authority, Justice Powell stated that the four essential freedoms constitute
academic freedom. 83 Justice Frankfurter had not said that they did so. Nor
had any one else said so. By 1978 a substantial body of scholarly literature
on the subject of academic freedom had been published, a body of literature
Justice Powell was either unaware of, or ignored. None of that literature had
equated academic freedom with The Open Universities' "four essential
freedoms." 84

77 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); see also supra
note 70 and accompanying text.
78
See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); see also supra notes 43-

58 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
80 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
84 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION
(Random House 1970); Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom -- Its Basic Philosophy,
Foundation, and History 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 431 (1963); William P. Murphy,
Academic Freedom - An Emerging ConstitutionalRight; Arval A. Moris, Academic Freedom
and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 487 (1963) ; Thomas I. Emerson and David
Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as Citizen, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
525 (1963). See also Comment, Developments in the Law, Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 1045 (1968); RicHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF

ACADEMIC FREEDOM INTHE UNrrED STATES (Columbia University Press 1955). None of these
publications suggested that academic institutions might or should be entitled to academic
freedom under the First Amendment, nor does The 1940 Statement on Principles of Academic
Freedom and Tenure, the basic professional standard for institutions of higher learning in the
United States. See AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3-4 (9th ed. 2001). For history and
analysis of The 1940 Statement, see Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principleson
Academic Freedom & Tenure, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1990).
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[6.] Justice Powell apparently considered the quoted language
authoritative, but did not explain how a concurring opinion could serve as
binding authority. 5 It is possible that Justice Powell intended to cite Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence as merely persuasive authority. However, in view
of his later reference to academic freedom as a "special concern of the First
Amendment" - language borrowed from Keyishian - and his subsequent
contention that "petitioner invokes a countervailing interest, that of the First
Amendment," 86 it appears more likely that Justice Powell intended his fellow
Justices to believe that the language from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
had somehow been transmuted into constitutional law.
[7.] That Justice Powell himself so believed seems likely in view of
the fact that immediately following the Sweezy concurrence quotation,
Justice Powell turned, now expressly, to Keyishian for support.87 In doing
so, however, Justice Powell, perhaps inadvertently, made the following
totally erroneous statement: "Our national commitment to the safeguarding
of these freedoms within university communities was emphasized in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.,8 8 Keyishian said nothing at all about the
four essential freedoms of a university,
much less emphasizing "our national
89
them.
safeguarding"
to
commitment
[8.] Justice Powell's quotation from Keyishian is prefaced by his
quotation from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence featuring the quoted
language about "the four essential freedoms" and the erroneous claim that
Keyishian emphasized "our national commitment to safeguarding these
freedoms;" it is followed by Justice Powell's reiteration of language from
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence about "speculation, experiment and
creation.". 90 Apparently Justice Powell intended to give the impression that
the language from Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence was somehow
adopted or ratified by the Keyishian Court; it had not been. 9'
[9.] Here Justice Powell states that the "atmosphere of 'speculation,
experiment and creation' .. . essential to the quality of higher education - is
widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body., 92 As sole
authority for this purportedly widely held belief, he quoted from a writing by

15

86
17

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
Id. at 312, 313.
ld. at 312-13.

88 Id. at 312.

89

See supra notes 73-111 and accompanying text.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
91 See William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the FirstAmendment in
the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 135-38 (1990) (urging that Justice Powell's discussion of academic
freedom was consistent with both Sweezy and Keyishian, in that it merely affirmed that the
medical school's faculty's admissions program was based upon its exercise of good faith
professional judgment). Nevertheless, Van Alstyne referred to "institutional academic
freedom" as if the Sweezy and Keyishian Courts had embraced that concept. Id. at 136-37.
92 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
90
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President William G. Bowen of Princeton University. President Bowen's
quoted remarks included no reference to "the atmosphere of speculation,
experiment and creation. 9 3
[10.] Justice Powell's next sentence appears to have been intended
to imply that Keyishian held that student body diversity was a First
Amendment value of some sort:
As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say
that the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as
diverse as this Nation of many peoples. 94
Although the actual quotation from Keyishian is enclosed by internal
quotation marks, the introduction, "As the Court noted in Keyishian . . ."
implies that Keyishian had somehow provided a constitutional foundation for
university admissions policies that would expose future leaders "to the ideas
and mores of students" from diverse backgrounds.9 5 Keyishian had done
nothing of the sort.
Justice Powell's cryptic reference to the First Amendment in part VA of his opinion likewise indicates that he somehow considered student body
diversity a First Amendment value: "[t]he experience of other university
admission programs, which take race into account in achieving the
educational diversity valued by the First Amendment, demonstrates that the
assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not a necessary
means toward that end.",96 Justice Powell did not explain or cite authority for
that "educational diversity [is] valued by the First
the proposition
97
Amendment."
[11.1 In the paragraph that follows, Justice Powell evidently meant
to cite Keyishian (and his own appended language) as constitutional
authority, not just as a statement of commendable social or public policy.
"Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select
those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,'
petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First
Amendment., 98 "Thus" signifies that Justice Powell thought or contended
that Keyishian had somehow constitutionalized the language quoted in
Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence about the freedom of a university
to select students. 99 It had not done so.'°°
9' Id. at 312
94
95

n.48.

Id.
id.312-13.

Id. at 316.
id.
9' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
99 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
1ooSee supra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
96

97
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[12.] By "countervailing constitutional interest," Justice Powell
evidently meant to suggest that Mr. Bakke's Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claim might be counter-balanced or off-set by the University's (or
its Medical School's) First Amendment right to select students.' 0' He did not
explain how a governmental agency engaged in state action might be deemed
to enjoy a First Amendment right to be free from0 2judicial review of
constitutional claims by persons affected by that action.
[13.] The final sentence in the quoted portion of Justice Powell's
reasoning seems more of a social policy than a constitutional argument: "In
this light, petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission. 10 3 The goal of
enrolling a diverse student body might be considered an important, or even
compelling, state interest.1'4 That such a goal was, arguably, of "paramount
importance," however, does not mean that the University was therefore
authorized by the First Amendment to achieve it.
How exactly Justice Powell believed or proposed that universities
themselves might be endowed with First Amendment rights with respect to
the "freedoms" stated in The Open Universities quotation from Justice
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence remains unclear. It does not matter
greatly, however, since no other Justice or Justices joined in Justice Powell's
reflections in regard to these matters.' 0 5 Various judges and commentators
have apparently overlooked this critical consideration. Justice Powell's
statements about academic freedom and the First Amendment, as well as his
re-interpretations of Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence and of the
Court's opinion in Keyishian, though no doubt of interest to legal scholars,
101See Finkin, supra note 38, at 850 (discussing Justice Powell's Bakke solo
opinion, Finkin observed, "Labeling [the medical school's] institutional function as 'academic
freedom' raises a countervailing constitutional claim in order to shield the preferential
admissions policy from more exacting examination").
10 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 943 n.25 (5th Cir. 1996):
Saying that a university has a First Amendment interest in [academic
freedom] is somewhat troubling. Both the medical school in Bakke and in
our case, the [University of Texas] law school are state institutions. The
First Amendment generally protects citizens from the actions of
government, not government from its citizens.
Id. (comment by Judge Jerry E. Smith).
See also J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 257 (1989).
"Why the First Amendment protects
administrative activities at some remove from teaching and scholarship has yet to be
adequately justified." Id. To date, no judge, Justice, or commentator has provided that
justification.
103 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
104 Four Justices in Bakke concluded that the School's "goal of admitting minority
students disadvantaged by the effects of past discrimination is sufficiently important to justify
use of race-conscious admissions criteria." Id. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003), the Court held that the
University of Michigan's Law School "has a compelling interest in a diverse student body."
105 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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are not the opinion of the Bakke Court, but are simply Justice Powell's own
thoughts, and carry no more authority than those found in a concurring
opinion. It is unlikely that any legal scholar or jurist would fail to agree with
the proposition articulated in one of the several opinions set out in Bakke
itself: "only a majority can speak for the Court or determine what is the
'central meaning' of any judgment of the Court."' 6 In any case, a solo
opinion is not a holding of the Court.
Some federal appellate courts have disagreed as to whether, in view
of Justice Powell's statement that student body diversity might be considered
a compelling state interest,'0 7 the Bakke Court's majority position could be so
construed as well. Four other Justices seemed to say that such diversity was
an important state interest. 0 8 The applicable standard for ascertaining the
Court's holding in such circumstances was set out in Marks v. United States:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds..."'09
There can be no doubt about the result if this standard is applied to Justice
Powell's lone statements about academic freedom and the First Amendment.
Only one other Justice in Bakke even mentioned academic freedom," ° and
none of the Justices, besides Justice Powell, discussed institutional academic
freedom or any First Amendment basis for it."' Justice Powell's lone
statements in regard to these matters cannot possibly be construed as the
holding or even the opinion of the Court.
V. AFTER JUSTICE POWELL'S SOLO BAKKE OPINION. THE
EMERGING NOTION THAT A SUPREME COURT HAD
GROUNDED INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM, OR
PERHAPS INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY, UPON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Until publication of Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion in 1978, no
one else had proposed that either Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence or
the Court's decision in Keyishian somehow meant that public colleges and
106

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 n.1. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
107 Id. at 314-16.
108 Id. at 324, 362-63 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see

also supra note 104.
109 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
"o Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402, 405 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
".. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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universities were endowed with academic freedom or autonomy as First
Amendment rights.' 1 2 Nor did judges, Justices or commentators do so
immediately following Bakke. The process, however, had begun.
This article now undertakes to track the re-interpretation of the three13
opinions that have given rise to the present state of confusion."
Necessarily, this account will involve some overlap or duplication, since
judges, Justices, and commentators 4often base their positions and proposals
on more than one of these sources.'
Five sets of Supreme Court cases are part of this subsequent history.
These are: Widmar v. Vincent (1981) and Justice Stevens' concurrence in the
case; 115 Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985);116
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC (1990);' 17 Justice Souter's concurrence
in Regents of the University of Wisconsin v. Southworth (2000);' 18 and
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). 1 9 Relevant portions of opinions in each case
will be examined in connection with one or more of this article's analytical
sub-sections. 12 None of the decisions in these cases held that academic
institutions are entitled to either academic freedom or autonomy under the
First Amendment, but in each case, there is21 either a concurring opinion or
dicta that has been construed to such effect.'
Readings and misreadings of Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence by various judges, Justices, and commentators will be
considered first; then some of the main errors as to what the Court did (and
did not) say in Keyishian; and finally,
the misleading consequences of
22
Justice Powell's solo opinion in Bakke.
A. JusticeFrankfurter'sSweezy ConcurrenceRevisited Following Bakke
Judges, Justices, and commentators have given expression to a
number of errors in their readings of and reflections upon Justice
112 See Comment, supra note 84, at 1065 n.2, n.3, 1067, 1073 (describing Sweezy
and Keyishian as cases relating to teachers' academic freedom or First Amendment rights).
113 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978).
114 See, e.g., infra notes 135-136, 148, 166, 188-193, 198, 250-252
and
accompanying
5 text.
I Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277-82 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring).
116 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
17 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
"1 Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236 (2000) (Souter,
J., concurring).
19 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
120 See, e.g., infra notes 135-137, 145-152, 166-169,
187-195, 259 and
accompanying
text (analyzing Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990)).
,2 1 See infra notes 194-195, 204-208, 229-240, 267-299, 307-313, 336-337, 343,
351 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 123-177, 178-200, 201-354 and accompanying text.
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The least important of these
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence. 123
misreadings is simply incorrect citation to the case. 124 More serious errors
relate to the language appearing in the final paragraph quoted from The Open
Universities that begins, "It is the business of a university .. ,,125 These
errors can be grouped under three categories: (1) failure to identify correctly
the source of the much-quoted language about "the business of a
university,"' 126 (2) confusion as to what this quoted language - or Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence - actually did or did not say, 127 and (3) treating
- quoted in a concurring opinion - as if it were the Court's
this language
128
holding.
1. Misantribution
Several judges and even some Justices have failed to observe that
Justice Frankfurter was quoting from The Open Universities book. Justice
Stevens mistakenly attributed this language to T. H. Huxley. 129 More
problematically, some judges have written as if they supposed that Justice
Frankfurter, himself, authored the quoted language. 130 What is more
surprising is that at one time and another even various Supreme Court
Justices mistakenly attributed the quoted language to Justice Frankfurter
himself. The first such instance was in Justice Powell's solo opinion in
Bakke.13 1 Quoting from Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence, Justice
Powell stated that Justice Frankfurter "summarized these four essential
freedoms."'' 32 In fact, Justice Frankfurter made no mention of these
freedoms or other language quoted from The Open Universities in his

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.).
See Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ.793 F.2d 419, 425-26 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing
"Sweeney v. New Hampshire.") (emphasis added).
2 See supra text accompanying note 23..
126 See infra notes 123-137 and accompanying text.
127 See infra notes 138-164 and accompanying text.
128 See infra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
129 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 279 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring).
See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (a possible explanation as to the likely basis for
this confusion).
130See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 414 (4th Cir. 2000); Feldman v.
Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir. 1999); Webb v. Bd.of Tr. Of Ball State Univ., 167 F.3d 1146,
1149 (7th Cir. 1999); Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 1983); Martin v.
Helstad, 699 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1983) and Martin, 699 F.2d at 397 (Coffey, J.
concurring).
131 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978).
132 Id. at 312 (emphasis added). See also Justice Thomas' dissent in Grutter v.
123
124

Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 363 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(introducing the quoted language with the phrase, "According to Justice Frankfurter ... " as
if Justice Frankfurter, himself, had written it).
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concurring1 4 statement.
question.

He quoted, but did not write the language in

1

Others also have mistakenly read language in Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence as if it were the opinion of the Court. Writing for a unanimous
Court in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, Justice Blackmun erroneously
attributed The Open Universities language to the Sweezy Court. "When, in
[Sweezy and Keyishian], the Court spoke of 'academic freedom' and the right
to determine on 'academic grounds who may teach' the Court was speaking
in reaction to content-based regulation."'' 35 Reference to a university's
freedom "to determine [for itself] on academic grounds who may teach" is
found only in The Open Universities language quoted by Justice Frankfurter
in his Sweezy concurrence. 136 It was not
quoted or repeated by either the
137
Sweezy plurality or the Keyishian Court.
2. What Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy Concurrence Did and Did Not Say
Several Justices and judges have misread Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence and/or the quoted Open Universities language in a variety of
ways. Misreadings by various Supreme Court Justices are considered first.
a. Misreadingsby Other Supreme Court Justices
One persistent misreading is the claim that in his concurrence,
Justice Frankfurter had proposed to ground Mr. Sweezy's speech or
academic freedom rights upon the First Amendment. The earliest instance is
found in Justice Clark's dissent in Sweezy: "My Brothers FRANKFURTER
and HARLAN ...join in the reversal... on the ground that Sweezy's rights
under the First Amendment have been violated.' 138 This might arguably be a
correct interpretation of Justice Frankfurter's reasoning with respect to
Sweezy's political rights. 139 But it is incorrect as to Justice Frankfurter's
analysis of what he called "governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of
a university."' 4 0 That portion of his concurrence, including his quotation

133 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255-67 (1957).
'34 Id.

at 262-63.

135Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990).

See also id. at 196 where
Justice Blackmun attributes The Open Universities language to Justice Frankfurter, himself.
136 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263. See also Abigail K. Holland, Note, The High Price of
Equality: The Effect of the Solomon Amendment on Law Schools' FirstAmendment Rights, 38
SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 855, 860 (2005) (ascribing language from The Open Universities
quoted in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence to "[t]he Court").
137 See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 234-255; Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589
(1967).
138 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 268 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting)
139See supra note 32.
140Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261.
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1 41
from The Open Universities,
makes no mention of Mr. Sweezy's First
42
Amendment rights.
Further confusion on this point is instanced in Justice Thomas'
dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger:

The constitutionalization of "academic freedom" began with
the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) ... The Court held
that the investigation violated due process ....
Justice Frankfurter went further, however, reasoning that the
First Amendment created a 43
right of academic freedom that
prohibited the investigation.1
As previously observed, Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence mentions
neither the First Amendment nor academic freedom, and at44 no point
attempted to say that the former somehow under-girded the latter.'
Justices Thomas and Scalia may have been misled by language in
Justice Blackmun's opinion in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.145 Here,
writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun erroneously stated that in
his Sweezy concurrence, Justice Frankfurter had "recognized that one of the
four essential freedoms that a university possesses under the First
141

Id. at 260-64.

142 Id. at 262-63.
143 539 U.S. 306,

362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Scalia, J.) (internal citations omitted). Justice Thomas cited all but one page of Justice
Frankfurter's twelve-page concurrence, but did not cite to any particular text where Justice
Frankfurter supposedly articulated this "reasoning." Id. at 362.
The Fourth Circuit likewise recently reported, erroneously, that Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence referred explicitly to academic freedom, as grounded in the
Constitution: "Justice Frankfurter ... relied explicitly on academic freedom in concluding
that Sweezy's contempt conviction offended the Constitution." Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d
401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
As noted above, Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence made no mention of the First Amendment or the Constitution as a basis for
academic freedom. Nor did it even mention academic freedom.
144Commentators sometimes also have been misled. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note
102, at 312 (discussing Justice Frankfurter's purported emphasis upon and description of
academic freedom in his Sweezy concurrence); Finkin, supra note 38, at 842-43 (referring to
Justice Frankfurter's "placing special emphasis on academic freedom"); Van Alstyne, supra
note 91, at 110. "Frankfurter and Harlan held, on first amendment academic freedom
grounds, that 'the first amendment shield[ed]' Sweezy's refusal to answer questions probing
the contents of his university lecture." Id. at 100; GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1407 n.5 (1 th ed. 1985) ("Justice Frankfurter's comment on academic freedom was among
the first to include that concept within the First Amendment."); Matthew J.Streb, The
Reemergence of the Academic Freedom Debate, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE DAWN OF A
NEW CENTURY 8 (Evan Gerstmann and Matthew J. Streb, eds., 2006). "[A] majority first
recognized academic freedom as a constitutional right in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957)."
Id. Streb evidently meant to include Justice Frankfurter in this "majority."
145Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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Amendment is the right to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach."'146 As mentioned previously, neither The Open Universities nor
Justice Frankfurter made any mention of the First1 47
Amendment in connection
with the "four essential freedoms of a university."
Justice Blackmun also characterized the issue in Sweezy incorrectly.
As to Sweezy (and also Keyishian) he wrote: "In those cases government
was attempting to control or direct the content of the speech engaged in by
the university or those affiliated with it.' 48 In fact, Sweezy said nothing at
all about "speech engaged in by the university."'' 4 9 The University of New
Hampshire was not a party to the case.15 0 Neither the Sweezy plurality nor
Justice Frankfurter even mentioned speech by the university.151 The question
before the2 Sweezy Court was whether Mr. Sweezy's own rights had been
5
violated.1
b. Misreadingsby Lower Federal Courts
Certain other misreadings and distortions of Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence and/or his quotation in it from The Open Universities may be
mentioned. For instance, in Webb v. Board of Trustees, a Seventh Circuit
Id. at 196 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
See supra note 32; see also supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
148 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990) (emphasis in original).
Keyishian had nothing to do with speech by a university, either. See supra notes 48-56 and
accompanying text..
149 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
15oId.
146
147

11 Id.

Id. Justice Blackmun so recognized in the sentence immediately following his
misstatement: "In Sweezy, for example, the Court invalidated the conviction of a person found
in contempt for refusing to answer questions about the content of a lecture he had delivered at
a state university." Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990). Yet, oddly, Justice
Blackmun let his misstatement stand.
One commentator has urged that Justice Frankfurter wrote "as if the university were
the real party to the suit, not Sweezy." The commentator reached this conclusion on the basis
of the fact that "at one point" Justice Frankfurter referred to Sweezy "as 'the witness,' rather
than as the petitioner." Byrne, supra note 102, at 312. On that page, Justice Frankfurter
referred to Sweezy as "the petitioner." His reference to Mr. Sweezy (if not to a hypothetical
individual) as "witness" is in the following context:
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from governmental
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university, such justification for
compelling a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture [as was given
by the New Hampshire Supreme Court] appears grossly inadequate.
Particularly is this so where the witness has sworn that neither in the
lecture nor at any other time did he ever advocate overthrowing the
Government by force and violence.
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J.,concurring). It is not apparent from this language
that Justice Frankfurter understood that the University, not Mr. Sweezy, was "the real party to
the suit." Mr. Sweezy had been compelled to testify as a "witness." See supra note 30; notes
24-28 and accompanying text.
152
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panel stated, on the basis of Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence that
"the University['s] ... ability to set a curriculum is as much an element of
153
academic freedom as any scholar's right to express a point of view."
Neither The Open Universities authors nor Justice Frankfurter had
distinguished between the freedoms of a university and those of its faculty. 54
An even more imaginative misreading of Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence in regard to curricular matters is set out in the Fourth Circuit's
155
en banc opinion in Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education.
Having cited Plato, Burke, and Justice Frankfurter's quotation from The
Open Universities, this court concluded, somewhat remarkably, "[w]e agree
with Plato and Burke and Justice Frankfurter that the school, not the teacher,
has the right to fix the curriculum."15 6 It might be mentioned
that Justice
1 57
Frankfurter's concurrence contains no language to that effect.
The Fourth Circuit recently offered another variation of this
8
misreading.1
Mistakenly
attributing
The Open Universities language to
Justice Frankfurter,
himself, this
court declared:
The right recognized by Justice Frankfurter .. . was not the
individual right claimed by Appellees, but rather an
institutional right belonging to the University of New
Hampshire .... Significantly, at no point in his concurrence
does Justice Frankfurter indicate that individual academic
freedom rights had been infringed; in his view, the
constitutional
harm fell entirely on the university as an
159
institution.
As previously observed, neither The Open Universities document nor Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence refers to either constitutionalrights or harms or to
academic freedom; necessarily neither the document nor the concurrence
60
says anything about such harms being inflicted upon a university.'
Though not citing Justice Frankfurter's quotation from The Open
Universities, a Seventh Circuit judge, evidently drawing on its language as
filtered through Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion, announced his own
153
154

Webb v. Bd. of Trustees, 167 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 1999).
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring); see supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
155 Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). For
facts and analysis see Hiers, supranote 33, at 89-93.
156 Boring, 136 F.3d at 370.
157 See id. at 370. Nor do the excerpts the court quoted from Plato or Burke.
158 See generally Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
159 Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412-13; see also infra notes 194-195 and accompanying
text; Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence as authority for the proposition that "[a] university's academic independence is
protected b the Constitution.").
See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
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views regarding academic freedom. "I would hold that the interest of
academic freedom includes the right of a university administration to
determine who may be admitted to study as well as a right to determine and
direct its faculty and student body."' 161 The judge did not explain whether he
was thinking of academic freedom as a First Amendment liberty or as a
social policy value, or why it should be regarded as a prerogative of a
university's administration.62 His conception of university governance
seems to have been based either upon the command-control model, or on a
mind-set of identification with and deference to those vested with
authority. 163 Other Seventh Circuit opinions regarding institutional academic
freedom have likewise tended to equate "the university" with its
administration. 164
3. A ConcurringOpinion is not the Holding of the Court or the Law of the
Land
Perhaps the most striking type of mistake courts and commentators
have made in regard to Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence has been to
cite it as if it represented the Court's majority holding and thus stated settled
constitutional law. 65
As previously noted, in The University of Pennsylvania case,
Justice Blackmun wrote with reference to Sweezy and Keyishian: "[w]hen in
those cases, the Court spoke of . . . the right to determine on 'academic
grounds who may teach' the Court was speaking in reaction to content-based
regulations."' 166 The italicized language here cited by Justice Blackmun is
found neither in the Sweezy plurality opinion nor in Keyishian, but only in
The Open Universities excerpt quoted in Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence. 67 The Court had not so spoken. 68 Justice Blackmun's error is
all the more remarkable because his opinion was joined by all the other
Supreme Court Justices.' 69 It might have been expected that at least one of
the nine Justices' several law clerks would have delicately drawn this error to
their attention.
Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387, 397 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J., concurring).
Id.
163 See generally THEODOR W. ADORNO, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
161
162

(Harper, 1950). More recent studies are cited in JOHN W. DEAN, CONSERVATIVES WITHOUT
CONSCIENCE (Viking, 2006).
164 See infra notes 241-266, 300-306 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., Lovelace v. S. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir. 1986).
166 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990) (emphasis added). See supra
notes 135-137, 145-152 and accompanying text (discussing other citations to Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence).
167 See supra text note 34 and accompanying text.
168 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Keyishian v. Rd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
169 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182. 184 (1990).
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Equally odd are those instances where courts have recognized that
Justice Frankfurter's opinion was in concurrence, but nevertheless accorded
it binding constitutional authority.
The earliest and possibly most
noteworthy such instances is Justice Powell's flat declaration in Bakke:
"[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body."1 7
As authority for this
7
declaration, Justice Powell cited Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence.1 '
This misunderstanding as to authority is echoed in some Seventh Circuit
opinions, notably by Judge Easterbrook:
A university's academic independence is protected by the
Constitution, just like a faculty member's own speech.
Concurring in Sweezy v. New Hampshire . . . . Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan referred to the four freedoms of a
university: "to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and
72
study.
to
admitted
be
may
who
Judge Easterbrook evidently italicized the phrase "of a university" in order to
clinch his contention that a "university's academic independence is protected
by the Constitution." He did not explain how or why a quotation from South
African scholars writing about conditions in South Africa might affect First
and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in the United States, or why
73 a
concurring opinion should be accorded the weight of constitutional law. 1
Some other courts and even a few commentators likewise seem to
have believed that Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence somehow had
morphed into the Court's holding. 74 Thus in time, Justice Frankfurter's
170 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).

Here as

elsewhere in parts IV-D and V-A of his opinion, Justice Powell was speaking only for himself,
since no other Justices joined in these portions of his opinion. See supra note 59.
1 See supra notes 70, 77-82 and accompanying text.
172 Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in
original)
(internal citations omitted). See also Webb v. Board of Trustees, 167 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (7th
Cir. 1999), where Judge Easterbrook likewise italicized "of a university" when making a
similar statement; Asociacion de Educacion Privida de Puerto Rico v. Echevarria-Vargas, 385
F.3d 81, 88 (1st Cir. 2004) (Toruella, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence as authority for "the four components of academic freedom").
Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence was also cited - unsuccessfully - as authority for institutional
academic freedom by George Washington University in a zoning case. George Washington
Univ. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 211-12 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
173 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2003); Wirsing v. Bd.
of Regents, 739 F.Supp. 551, 553 (D.Colo. 1990), affid 945 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1991). See
also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (citing Justice Frankfurter's concurrence as
authority for the purported "right of the University to make academic judgments as to how
best to allocate scarce resources or 'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught.., and who may be admitted to study."'). The Widmar majority
implied that this "right" was related to "the academic freedom of public universities," but did
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concurrence in Sweezy became the foundation for the notion that academic
institutions themselves - or their administrators - were entitled to academic
freedom or autonomy under the First Amendment. Significantly, it would be
more than two decades after Sweezy before any judge, Justice, or
commentator so proposed.175 That they did so at all was because they came
to view76it through lenses supplied by Justice Powell in his solo opinion in
Bakke. 1
Justice Powell not only read Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence in a special way. He also proposed a distinctive and erroneous
reading of the Court's opinion in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.177
B. Keyishian Revisited and Misread in Light of Justice Powel's Bakke
Solo Opinion
As will be seen, many Justices, judges, and commentators came to
read Keyishian as it was described in Justice Powell's solo opinion. Perhaps
this is not surprising, since courts and their law clerks often rely on more
recent cases' accounts as to the meaning of earlier cases. This section first
examines Justice Powell's own construction or reconstruction of
Keyishian.178 It then turns to a series of misreadings of Keyishian that appear
79
to derive from Justice Powell's account of it in his Bakke solo opinion.
1. Justice Powell's Own Reconstruction of Keyishian
Justice Powell revisited and proceeded to reconstruct Keyishian in
his solo opinion in Bakke. 180 Early in part IV-D, Justice Powell quoted the
"It is the business of a university" language from Justice Frankfurter's
Sweezy concurrence (without noting that it derived from The Open

not mention the First Amendment as basis for either that "right" or public universities'
academic freedom. Id. at 276 n.20, 264-277.
Peter Byrne identifies Sweezy as part of "[t]he Court's new elaboration of
institutional academic freedom." Byrne, supra note 102, at 312. See also David M. Rabban,
A FunctionalAnalysis of "Individual" and "Institutional"Academic Freedom Under the First
Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 280 (1990).
175 See infra notes 223-354 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 59-111 and accompanying text.
177 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
178 See infra notes 180-186 and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
180 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978). These
pages contain parts IV-D and V-A of Justice Powell's opinion. No other Justice or Justices
joined in these portions of the opinion.
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Universities),'81 but then followed it182 with a totally erroneous statement
regarding the substance of Keyishian:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four
essential freedoms of a university - to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(concurring in result).
Our national commitment to the safe-guarding of these
freedoms within university communities was emphasized in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).183
In fact, Keyishian said absolutely nothing about safeguarding85 "these
freedoms,"' 184 and nothing at all as to university admissions policies.'
Later in the same paragraph, Justice Powell again ascribed to
Keyishian significant language that is nowhere to be found in that case: "As
the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the 'Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples. 186 However
commendable exposure "to the ideas and mores of students, as diverse as this
Nation of many peoples" might be as a matter of social policy, neither that
language nor the concept of diversity has any basis whatsoever in Keyishian.
Justice Powell's own misreading or misrepresentation of Keyishian
directly influenced subsequent interpretation of that case by those who took
his reconstruction at face value. Many such interpreters apparently preferred
to trust Justice Powell's rendition rather than draw their own conclusions as
to the meaning of the case as published in the reporters.
2. Derivative Misreadingsof Keyishian
Justice Blackmun's opinion in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
suggests that he misread or confused the substance of Keyishian under the
181 Id. at 312.
182See analysis of Justice Powell's combination of language from Keyishian,
Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence and Justice Powell's own statements. See supra
notes 73-110 and accompanying text.
183 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (internal quotations omitted).
184 As mentioned earlier, Keyishian made no mention of, nor did it quote from
Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
185 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); supra notes 43-58 and
accompanying text.
186 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13.

INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

2007]

influence of Justice Powell's reconstruction. 187 Referring to both Sweezy
and Keyishian, Justice Blackmun wrote: "In those cases government was
attempting to control or direct the content of the speech engaged in by the
university or those affiliated with it.' 188 Sweezy and Keyishian can be
viewed as cases dealing with governmental efforts to control or limit speech
by persons affiliated with state universities; however, it is completely
inaccurate to say that these cases in any way involved speech engaged in by
universities themselves. 189 Justice Blackmun may have assumed that the
universities involved in the Sweezy and Keyishian cases supported the
speaker's or faculty members' speech interests; but these cases clearly had to
do with individual speakers' First Amendment rights, not those of
universities. 190 Justice Blackmun also stated, incorrectly, that these cases
attributed the right to determine on "academic grounds who may teach" to
the universities themselves. 191 Justice Blackmun may have assumed that the
universities involved in the Sweezy and Keyishian cases supported the
speaker's or faculty members' speech interests; but these cases clearly had to
do with individual speakers' First Amendment rights, not those of
universities. Neither the Sweezy plurality nor the Keyishian Court ' had
, ' 192
spoken of "the right to determine on 'academic grounds who may teach.
That language derives solely from The Open193Universities book quoted by
Justice Frankfurter in his Sweezy concurrence.
Incorrect or groundless assertions by the Court, even if only in dicta,
may be perpetuated by inattentive references in later court decisions. This
point is illustrated, for example, by the Fourth Circuit's en banc
reconstruction of Keyishian on the basis of Justice Blackmun's erroneous
comments:
The discussion by the Court indicates . . . that it was not
focusing upon the individual rights of teachers, but rather on
the impact of the New York provisions on schools as
institutions. The vice of the New York provisions was that
they impinged upon the freedom of the university as an
187
188

Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
Id. at 187 (emphasis in original). As to Justice Blackmun's similar confusion in

regard to Sweezy, see supra notes 145-152 and accompanying text. Commentators also were
misled. See, e.g. Rabban, supra note 174, at 280: "Early cases such as Sweezy and Keyishian
recognized constitutional academic freedom as an individual as well as an institutional right."
189 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
190 See supra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
191 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 187 (1990) "When, in those cases, the
Court spoke of 'academic freedom' and the right to determine on 'academic grounds who may
teach' the Court was speaking in reaction to content-based regulation." The Court so spoke in
neither of these cases.
192 Id.
193 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

32

HAMLINE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

institution. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493,
U.S. 182, 198, 110 S.Ct. 577 . . . (1990) (noting that
Keyishian was a case involving governmental infringement
on the right of an institution "to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).' 94
Thus error begets error, and illusions come to take on a life of their own.
The Urofsky Court did not mention that the University of Pennsylvania Court
had rejected the University's claim to 1any
constitutional "academic freedom"
95
privilege under the First Amendment.
More recently, Justice O'Connor - and four other Justices - were
misled by Justice Powell's apparent misrepresentation of language from
Keyishian in his Bakke solo opinion:
Justice Powell emphasized that nothing less than the
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as
this Nation of many peoples." [438 U.S.] at 313 (quoting
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967).196
It is not clear from this citation whether Justice O'Connor was aware that
when writing the phrase ".... to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as
this Nation of many peoples," Justice Powell was not quoting from
Keyishian, but instead was197inserting his own language and presenting it as if
it derived from Keyishian.

194

Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 414 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

As to

Urofsky, see also supra notes 30, 143 and accompanying text; notes 158-160; infra note 221
and accompanying text. Latter-day readings of both Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence
and Keyishian are strangely riddled with both minor and major mistakes. Evidently the
Urofsky court believed that the language of Keyishian itself could be ignored. See supra notes
49-55 and accompanying text. Compare Urofsky with Hardy v. Jefferson Community
College, 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001) (correctly noting that Keyishian referred to
teachers' First Amendment rights).
Among many pointed critiques of Urofsky, see Rebecca Gose Lynch, Comment,
Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy? Analyzing Professors' Academic Freedom
Rights Within the State's ManagerialRealm, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1063, 1073-1108 (2003); J.
Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 110-12
(2003). Byrne wrote: "This is the worst academic freedom decision since the notorious
Bertrand Russell case in 1940." Id. at 111. Other critiques are cited in Hiers, supra note 38,
at 554 n.129.
195 See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000); Univ. of
Pa. v. EEOC,
493 U.S. 182, 195-202. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
196 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003).
197 See supra notes 70, 94-95 and accompanying text.
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Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter added another gloss to
Keyishian. Reverting to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, she stated:
...Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming "the right to
select those students who will contribute most to the 'robust
exchange of ideas,"' a university "seek[s] to achieve a goal
that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its
mission." 438 U.S. at 313 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., supra, at 603).198
The expression that thereby a university "seek[s] to achieve a good that is of
paramount importance to the fulfillment of its mission" is not quoted from
Keyishian; nor did Justice Powell attribute it to Keyishian. 99 The expression
derives solely from Justice Powell's solo opinion. 2°°
C. Subsequent Misunderstandings and Misapplications of Justice Powell's
Solo Opinion in Bakke
As indicated in the preceding analysis, Justice Powell's solo opinion
in Bakke could be read to say that academic institutions of higher learning
themselves enjoy academic freedom under the First Amendment. 0 1
Surprisingly, a number of Justices, judges, and commentators have come to
regard Justice Powell's solo opinion as if it were the holding of the Court in
Bakke. Some notable instances of this misunderstanding are described
next.2 °2 In addition, several Justices, judges, and commentators have read
various meanings into Justice Powell's concurrence that go well beyond its
explicit language. These revisionist readings or re-interpretations of Justice
Powell's Bakke solo opinion will be considered in the remaining portion of
203
this section.
1. TreatingJustice Powell's Bakke Solo Opinion as the Opinion of the
Court
It has already been observed that judges, Justices, and commentators
occasionally confuse Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence with the
Sweezy Court's opinion. 20 4 The same kind of confusion also occasionally

198

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.

199 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Justice Powell's Bakke
solo opinion, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-19.
200 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
201 See supra notes 59-111 and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 204-222 and accompanying text.
203 See infra notes 223-354 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
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occurs with respect to Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion. °5 Some courts
mistakenly described it as the Supreme Court's opinion, or at least its
The fact that the published Supreme Court reporters
"plurality" opinion.
did not attach the label "concurring" or "dissenting" to those portions of
Justice Powell's opinion that were not joined by four other Justices may have
contributed to the problem. 20 7 Still other courts and commentators, while
recognizing it as a solo opinion (or concurrence), nevertheless have treated it
as if it were somehow controlling. 0 8
a. Widmar v. Vincent
The earliest instance of this confusion is in Widmar v. Vincent, a
case concerning use of a state university's facilities by a student religious
group. 209 Here the Court cited language from Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy
concurrence that had been quoted in Part IV-D of Justice Powell's Bakke
solo opinion as authority for the proposition that the University had a "right.
. . to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or
'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.' 2 10 It is
not clear that the Widmar Court was aware that the language from Justice
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence was quoted only in Justice Powell's solo
opinion and, therefore, did not constitute the Bakke Court's holding.211 The
Supreme Court had not established any such right. In a footnote, the Widmar
Court implied that this "right" was derived from "the academic freedom of
public universities. 2t 2 That public universities were entitled to academic
freedom likewise had been asserted only in Justice Powell's Bakke solo
. . 213
opinion.
In any case, the Widmar Court's citations to Justices Frankfurter's
concurrence and Powell's solo opinion and its footnote reference to the
academic freedom of public universities are all dicta. The Court's holding
rested upon its conclusion that the state's asserted interest "in achieving
greater separation of church and state than is already ensured under the
Establishment Clause... is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this
205

Given the facts that various Justices joined different parts of Justice Powell's

Bakke opinion, and that the published report included opinions by five other Justices or
clusters of Justices, some agreeing with Justice Powell as to results, while also dissenting, it is
understandable that readers might well have been confused.
206 See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
207 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
m See infra notes 215-222 and accompanying text.
209 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
210 Id. at 276.
211 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
212 Widmar, 454 at 276 n.20.
213 The Widmar Court did not purport to ground either public universities' "right"
to make such judgments or their academic freedom on the First Amendment.
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case by the Free Speech Clause as well," and was, therefore, not sufficiently
"'compelling' to justify content-based discrimination against [the students']
religious speech. ' 14
b. Lower Federal Courts and Commentators
At least two Seventh Circuit opinions mischaracterize Justice
Powell's Bakke solo opinion as his "plurality opinion. 2 15 Several cases and
a few commentators cite this solo opinion as if it were the opinion, or even
the holding of the Bakke Court.
Perhaps the earliest example of this misreading is from the Second
Circuit in Gray v. Board of Higher Education, City of New York, where the
court stated:
In Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 98 S.Ct. 2773 . . .the Supreme Court acknowledged
that academic freedom included as one of its elements the
right of colleges and universities to choose their students ...
216

Such language, however, is found only in Justice Powell's Bakke solo
opinion.21 7 Other federal courts, such as the First and Third Circuits,

214 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276. As to the critical difference between holdings and
dicta, and difficulties distinguishing the two, see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams,
Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2005). The authors propose the following summary
definitions:
A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen decisional path
or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the
facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a
proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.
Id. at 961. The authors give careful attention to several of Justice Powell's statements or
propositions in Bakke, but do not discuss Justice Powell's comments about academic freedom
or the First Amendment, probably because those comments are found only in his solo opinion,
and, therefore, are not even dicta. Id. at 961-94
2 5 EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 1983)
(panel opinion by Coffey, J.); Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387, 397 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J.,
concurring). Black's Law Dictionary defines a "plurality opinion" as follows: "An opinion of
an appellate court in which more justices join than in any concurring opinion (though not a
majority of the court) is a plurality opinion as distinguished from a majority opinion in which
a larger number of justices on the panel join than not." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (6th
ed. 1990).
216 Gray v. Bd. of Higher Educ., New York, 692 F. 2d 901, 908 (2d Cir. 1982).
Another instance is Mincone v. Nassau County Cmty. Coll., 923 F.Supp. 398, 402 (E.D.N.Y.
1996). "[A]cademic freedom is a special concern of the first amendment, which extends both
to educators and institutions" Id. (citing Bakke without noting that here Justice Powell was
writing onl for himself).
2i7 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13.
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21 8
likewise have treated that language as if it came from the Court, itself
Therefore, it is not surprising that an amicus brief recently submitted to the
Supreme Court stated incorrectly: "Justice Powell's opinion is controlling
with regard to its statements that rely on the First Amendment's protections
for academic freedom because it garnered the support from four Justices of
the Brennan plurality. 2 19
Even legal scholars have mistaken Justice Powell's solo opinion for
the opinion of the Court or as otherwise somehow "controlling." For
example, one legal scholar has written:

Beginning no later than 1978 ...the Court has developed a
concept of academic freedom as a qualified right of the
institution to be free from government interference in its
core administrative activities, such as deciding who may
teach and who may learn.22 °
Citations to Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion sometimes omit any
reference to its status as a solo opinion, thereby conveying the impression
that it carried greater authority. 221 In some instances, while recognizing its
218

See, e.g., Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2001); Edwards v. Cal.

Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 492 (3rd Cr. 1998) (citing "opinion of Powell, J." as "case law
from the Supreme Court); Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir.
1986).
219 Compare Brief for Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) with
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996): "Justice Powell's argument in [Part IVD of his opinion in] Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented the view of a
majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case."
220 Byrne, supra note 102 at 257; see also id. at 313 (describing Justice Powell's
discussion of "institutional autonomy" as part of "his separate yet controlling opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke."). Byrne did not explain why or how this
"separate" opinion could be considered "controlling."
See also Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REv. 831,
856 (1987). "In Bakke, an outsider to the University, an applicant for admission, challenged
the University's admissions policies, and, in the name of institutional academic freedom, the
University's position was largely vindicated." Id.; David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom,
Individual or Institutional?, 87 ACADEME 16 (Nov. - Dec. 2001) ("Bakke and Widmar, the
first Supreme Court cases that recognized a distinctive category of institutional academic
freedom under the First Amendment ...");Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46
B.C.L. REv. 461, 461, 465-66, 468, 491-94 (2005) "Bakke represented a significant shift in
the constitutional law of academic freedom .... Id. at 465. "[T]he implications of Bakke's
institutional autonomy theory of academic freedom .... Id. at 468.
221 See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,414 (4th Cir. 2000) (referring to the
"opinion of Powell, J." regarding academic freedom as part of "more recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence"); Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985)
(citing "Justice Powell's opinion" as authority for use of the "equivocal" term "academic
freedom" as meaning "the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference
from the government."); EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir.
1983); Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Ailsa W. Chang, Note,
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status as a solo opinion (or concurrence), a few federal appellate judges have,
nevertheless, cited it as if it were, somehow, binding or controlling authority
anyway.222
Since 1978, several courts and some commentators also have found
meanings in Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion that do not plainly appear in
its language. Patterns and examples of these readings or misreadings will
now be considered.
2. Revisionist Readings and Re-interpretations of Justice Powell's Bakke
Concurrence
Two revised versions or reconstructions of Justice Powell's Bakke
solo opinion commonly came to expression in following years. One suggests
that a college's or university's academic freedom is distinct from, and may
be in opposition to its faculty's academic freedom. The other is that actions
by a college or university should be free from governmental "interference,"
even in the form of judicial review. It may be noted that Justice Powell's
Bakke solo opinion advocated neither such proposition.223 The earliest
instance of such reconstruction was in Cooperv. Ross. 224
a. Cooper v. Ross
Cooper v. Ross, an Arkansas District Court opinion written in 1979,
a year after Bakke, is the earliest instance of both misreadings: 'The present
case ... involves a fundamental tension between the academic freedom of
the individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university
administration, and the academic freedom of the university to be free of

Resuscitating the Constitutional "Theory" of Academic Freedom: A Search For a Standard
Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REv. 915, 932 n.83 (2001).
222 See, e.g., Asociacion de Educacion Privida de Puerto Rico v. Echevarria-Vargas,
385 F.3d 81, 88 (1st Cir. 2004) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Powell's solo opinion
as authority for declaring that the First Amendment guarantees academic freedom for
administrative actions by private secondary school officials); see also Hulen v. Yates, 322
F.3d 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2003): "[W]e ... acknowledge the 'freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education,' Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
312 ....
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring)". See Byrne, supra note 194, at 87-88 (referring
correctly to Justice Powell's "concurring opinion" in Bakke, but then stating that "Bakke set
the method for considering institutional academic freedom in a constitutional case").
223 The University of California, Davis, Medical School's admissions plan had been
developed by the School's faculty, and was administered by both faculty and administrative
officers of the School. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
Moreover, Justice Powell declared that the School's admissions program violated
Bakke's right to equal protection. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Justice Powell
did not suggest that a university's academic freedom might conflict with its faculty's
academic freedom; and he certainly did not propose that a university's policies and procedures
should be exempt or immune from judicial review.
224 Cooper v. Ross, 472 F.Supp. 802 (E. D. Ark. 1979).
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government, including judicial, interference., 225 The court's assumption that
a university was entitled to academic freedom derived, evidently, from
Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion.
The idea that both universities and their faculties are entitled to
academic freedom under the First Amendment, and that these two academic
freedoms may conflict, was elaborated later, particularly in a number of
Seventh Circuit opinions. These Seventh Circuit opinions very likely also
derived in part from its panels' reading or misreading of language in a
concurring opinion by Justice Stevens. As will be noted, Justice Stevens'
concurrence in turn was grounded upon Justice Frankfurter's
Sweezy
226
concurrence and Justice Powell's solo opinion in Bakke.

227
b. Justice Stevens' Concurrence in Widmar v. Vincent

Justice Stevens had served as an appellate judge on the Seventh
Circuit, and, following his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1975, was
the Court's representative "allotted" to that Circuit. 228 It may be assumed

that Seventh Circuit judges in the early 1980s knew Justice Stevens
personally and held in high regard the opinions he wrote as a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent was announced
in 1981 .229 The case concerned a student religious group's First Amendment
complaint about being denied use of facilities at the University of
Missouri. 230

The Court held that the University's "exclusionary policy"

violated "the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should
be content neutral. 2 31
Justice Stevens concurred, but objected that the majority's "use of
the terms 'compelling state interest' and 'public forum' to analyze the
question presented in this case may needlessly undermine the academic
freedom of public institutions. 2 32 He continued:
In my opinion, a university should be allowed to decide for
itself whether [for example] a program that illuminates the
genius of Walt Disney should be given precedence over one
that may duplicate material in the classroom. Judgments of
this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal
Id. at 805. For facts and analysis, see Hiers, supra note 33, at 64-66.
See infra notes 234-240 and accompanying text.
227 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277-81 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
228 United States Reports regularly lists the "allotment" of Justices to the various
225

226

Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. See, e.g., 428 U.S. p. iv; 429 U.S. p. v.
229 Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see supra notes 209-214 and accompanying text.
230 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-67.
231 Id. at 277.
232 Id. at 277-78.
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judges, and their standards for decision should not be
encumbered
with ambiguous phrases like 'compelling state
233
interest.'
In a footnote to his statement that such judgments should be made by
academicians rather than by federal judges, Justice Stevens added, "Justice
Frankfurter forcefully spoke of the grave harm resulting from governmental
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university .... [354 U.S.] at 261. "234
He then quoted the familiar "It is the business of a university" language
found in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, mistakenly ascribing it to T. H.
Huxley, rather than The Open Universities.235 He proceeded then to construe
broadly the implications of this language: "Although these comments were
not directed at a public university's concern with extracurricular activities, it
is clear that the 'atmosphere' of a university includes such a critical aspect of
campus life., 236 Justice Stevens then cited, "University of California.
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (opinion of POWELL, J.) ('Academic
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has
23 7
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.')
Justice Stevens did not specifically propose that the "freedoms of a
university" were either properly characterized as "academic freedom ' 238 or
protected by the First Amendment from "governmental intrusion. '' 239 But his
quotation from Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion suggests that he may
have accepted Justice Powell's theory that there might be some connection
among these "freedoms," academic freedom, and the First Amendment. It
may be important to notice that Justice Stevens did not distinguish between
faculty "academicians" and administrative "academicians," nor did he
suggest that °the academic freedom of a university might conflict with that of
24
its faculty.
c. In the Seventh Circuit
The earliest Seventh Circuit opinion to distinguish between
institutional academic freedom and faculty academic freedom was Dow
Chemical Co. v. Allen. 24 1 The Dow court did not suggest that these two types
233 Id. at 278-79.
234 Id. at 279 n.2.
235 Id. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
236 Widmar, 454 U.S. 279 n.2
237

Id.

Compare Widmar, 454 U.S 263 (1981) with Justice Powell's Bakke solo
opinion, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312, which identified the former as the latter.
239 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
240 See infra notes 267-299 and accompanying text (discussion Regents of the
238

University of Michigan v. Ewing).
241 Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982). "Case law
considering
the standard to be applied where the issue is the academic freedom of the university to be free
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of academic freedom were in conflict - nor had Justice Stevens done so in
his Widnar concurrence.24 2 The court cited Justice Powell's unidentified
paraphrase from Keyishian: "[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of
the First Amendment. ' 243 Justice Stevens had quoted the same statement in a
footnote to his Widmar concurrence. 2 " It is likely that the Dow panel was
familiar with that concurrence and footnote.24 5 The court found that three
University of Wisconsin research faculty members' "interest in academic
freedom" might "properly figure into the legal calculation" as to whether a
private corporation might subpoena their entire work products .246 It
concluded, "[T]here is little to justify an intrusion into university life which
would risk substantially chilling the exercise of academic freedom., 247 The
University was not a party to the case and the Court made no finding as to its
putative academic freedom. 248 Subsequent Seventh Circuit panels and judges
were not always so circumspect.
A concurring opinion by Judge Coffey in Martin v. Helstad, decided
the next year, showed which way the wind would soon blow. 249 Judge
Coffey expanded considerably upon Justice Powell's revision of Justice
Frankfurter's quotation from The Open Universities. "I would hold that the
interest of academic freedom includes the right of a university administration
to determine who may be admitted to study as well as a right to determine
and direct its faculty and student body. '250 Here Judge Coffey explicitly
assigned a university's academic freedom to its administration.2 ' As
of governmental interference, as opposed to academic freedom of the individual teacher to be
free of restraints from the university administration, is surprisingly sparse." Id. at 1275. Very
likely the Dow court derived the idea that the university itself might enjoy an "academic
freedom.., to be free of governmental interference" from Justice Stevens' comments in his
Widmar concurrence which, in turn, were based on his reflections regarding Justice Powell's
Bakke solo opinion. A close reading of the Dow court's opinion indicates that its "opposed
to" expression really meant "as distinct from." The Dow court was not engaged in balancing
(purported) institutional academic freedom against faculty academic freedom, but simply
wondering what standards would be applicable in each kind of case.
242 See generally Hiers, supra note 33, at 67-69.
243 Dow, 672 F.2d at 1274.
244 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
245 See supra note 228, 241, 244 and accompanying text; see also infra note 247
and accompanying text.
246 Dow, 672 F.2d at 1276-77.
247 Id. at 1277.
Here, again, we see an echo of Justice Stevens' Widmar
concurrence which quoted Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence as to "governmental
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university."
248 See Dow, 672 F.2d 1262.
249 Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J., concurring).
250 Id. at 397. See supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text; infra note 252 and
accompanying text.
z' Martin, 699 F.2d at 397. Judge Coffey also stated, possibly paraphrasing from
Justice Powell' Bakke solo opinion, "Basic academic decisions, such as the determination as
to the make up of the faculty and who may be a student on the first day of classes, have long
been regarded as among the essential freedoms of a university administration." Id. Judge
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authority for so assigning, Judge Coffey quoted from Justice Powell's
"plurality opinion" in Bakke, and from Justice Powell's quotation about "the
business of a university" from Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence. 252
The Martin panel offered its own expansive reading of Justice
Powell's Bakke solo opinion:
The deference accorded academic dismissals is based on the
policy of fostering academic freedom at the university level.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S.265, 311-15, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2759-61 ...(1978) (Powell,
J.). This policy is of greater importance in the case of
admissions. Id. at 312, 98 S.Ct. at 2759.253
Contrary to the panel's apparent meaning, Justice Powell's Bakke solo
opinion said nothing at all about academic dismissals or any connection
between such dismissals and academic freedom; necessarily, Justice Powell
did not ascribe greater importance to academic freedom in regard to
academic admissions than in regard to dismissals.254
The same year, another Seventh Circuit panel held that the
University of Notre Dame du Lac was entitled to "a qualified academic
Coffey did not cite authority for this statement, possibly because there was none. Writing
after Widmar, but before Martin, one legal scholar already visualized the kind of problematic
outcome that would result from this trend in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence:
The potential evil of the theory of "institutional" academic freedom lies in
this very lack of differentiation [between institutional autonomy and
faculty academic freedom], because, the interests insulated are not
necessarily those of teachers and researchers but [rather those of] of the
administration and governing boards; the effect is to insulate management
decision making from close scrutiny, even in cases where the rights or
interests of the faculty might be adverse to the institution's administration.
Consequently, the theory of "institutional" academic freedom would
provide institutional autonomy with more than a prudential claim to
judicial deference; it provides a constitutional shield against interventions
that would not ordinarily seem improper, for example, judicial
intervention on behalf of faculty whose civil or academic rights had been
infringed by the institution.
Finkin, supra note 38, at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted). The kind of interpretation
advocated here by Judge Coffey turns the First Amendment on its head by assigning its
protection to university administrators, who in public colleges or universities, are state agents,
as a weapon to use against individual faculty whose speech rights are protected by that
Amendment, according to the Sweezy plurality and Keyishian. See supra notes notes 29-30
and accompanying text; see also supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
.2Martin, 699 F.2d at 397. It will be recalled that neither Justice Powell's Bakke
solo opinion nor Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence distinguished between a university
and its faculty, or between a university's academic freedom and its faculty's academic
freedom. Nor did either opinion accord academic freedom to a university's administration.
253 Id. at 391. The quoted language appears to refer to institutional, rather than
individual faculty, academic freedom.
254 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-19.
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freedom privilege protecting academic institutions against the disclosure of
the names and identities of persons participating in the peer review
process."2" The panel cited Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion and his
quotations from Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence and from
Keyishian as authority. 22566 The panel was under the impression that it was
joining "other courts in recognizing a limited academic freedom privilege in
the context of challenges to college or university tenure decisions. 25 7
Actually, none of the cases cited to that effect had so held - a point
mentioned here only as another instance of judicial error or confusion in
regard to purported institutional academic freedom.25 8 The Supreme Court
effectively over-ruled Notre
Dame du Lac a few years later in University of
59
Pennsylvania v. EEOC2
Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion figured both directly and
indirectly in several later Seventh Circuit panel opinions. One panel opinion
was especially important in shaping subsequent Seventh Circuit
jurisprudence: Piarowski v. Illinois Community College.260 Mr. Piarowski
was chairman of the college art department. College officials asked him to
remove three racially and sexually offensive representations from one of the
school's main hallways, but he refused to do So.261 When officials moved
them anyway, he claimed they thereby violated his First Amendment
rights.26 2 Judge Posner wrote for the panel:
[T]hough many decisions describe "academic freedom" as
an aspect of the freedom of speech that is protected against
governmental abridgement by the First Amendment... the
term is equivocal. It is used to denote both the freedom of
the academy to pursue its ends without interference from the
government (the sense in which it is used, for example, in
Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke... or in our recent decision in E.E.O.C.
v. University of Notre Dame du Lac.. .), and the freedom of
the individual teacher . . . to pursue his ends without
255
256
257
258
259

EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 335-36.
Id. at 377.
See Hiers, supra note 33, at 72-75 as to particulars.
Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990). The Court granted certiorari in

order to resolve "what might be thought of as a conflict" between the Third Circuit's rejection
of the University of Pennsylvania's claim to a qualified academic freedom privilege under the
First Amendment, and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Notre Dame du Lac. Id. at 188. The
Court concluded "that the EEOC subpoena process does not infringe any First Amendment
right" enjoyed by the University of Pennsylvania. Id. at 201.
260 Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll., 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985). See also infra
notes 300-306 and accompanying text.
261 Piarowski,759 F.2d at 626-28.
262

Id.
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interference from the academy; and these two freedoms are
in conflict, as in this case.263
Neither Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion nor the Seventh Circuit's Notre
Dame du Lac opinion distinguished between a university's putative academic
freedom and that of its faculty. 264 Nor did Justice Stevens so distinguished in

Perhaps Judge Posner derived this
his Widmar concurrence. 6 5
characterization from Judge Coffey's concurrence in Martin.26 6 No one had
previously suggested that the term "academic freedom" was "equivocal."
d. Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing
Judge Posner's characterization of "academic freedom" as equivocal
was soon echoed by Justice Stevens in Regents of the University of Michigan
v. Ewing.267 The Court decided Ewing just ten days after it denied Mr.
Piarowski's petition for writ of certiorari. 268 Language in Ewing suggesting
that academic institutions themselves are entitled to academic freedom - or
autonomy - under the First Amendment, derives from Justice Powell's Bakke
solo opinion and his re-interpretation in it of Keyishian and Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy. Ewing is sometimes said to have been
one of the cases in which the Supreme Court held that institutional academic
freedom (or autonomy) is protected under the First Amendment.269
Scott E. Ewing had been a medical student in a special program
("Inteflex") at the University of Michigan.27 ° Students who wished to
continue in this program were required to pass the National Board of
Medical Examiners (NMBE) Part 1 Examination.27 1 Mr. Ewing failed to do
so and was dismissed from the program.27 2 The Sixth Circuit held that the
University had violated Ewing's substantive due process property right by
refusing to allow him to re-take the examination.2 73 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order "to consider whether the Court of Appeals had
misapplied the doctrine of substantive due process," subsequently held that it
had done so, and reversed.27 4 The Court reasoned, in part, as follows:
263 Id. at 629 (citations omitted). As to facts and issues in Piarowski,see generally,
Hiers, supra note 33, at 78-8 1.
264 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-19 (1978); EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac,
715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
265 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277-81 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring).
266 See supra notes 251-252 and accompanying text.
267 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
268 Ewing was decided on December 12, 1985. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214. The Court
had denied Mr. Piarowski's petition for writ of certiorari on December 2, 1985. Id. at 1007.
269 See infra notes 277, 283, and 294and accompanying text.
270 Ewing v. Bd. of Regents, 742 F.2d 913,913-14 (6th Cir. 1984).
271 Id.
272

Id.

273 Id. at 915-16 (internal quotations omitted).
274 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 221-28 (1985).

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

Ewing's claim ... must be that the University misjudged his
fitness to remain a student in the Inteflex program. The
record unmistakably demonstrates, however, that the
faculty's decision was made conscientiously and with
careful deliberation based on an evaluation of the entirety of
Ewing's academic career. When judges are asked to review
the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this
one, they should show great respect for the faculty's
professional judgment.2 75
Consequently, the Court found no substantive due process violation: "[Mr.
Ewing's] dismissal from the Inteflex program rested on an academic
judgment that is not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decision-making
when viewed against the background of his entire career at the University of
Michigan, including his singularly low score on the NMBE Part 1
examination. '2 76
Certain language in Justice Stevens' Ewing opinion has prompted a
few commentators to conclude that the Ewing Court held that universities or
their professional schools are entitled to academic freedom based upon the
First Amendment. 77 The language in question, however, does not sustain
that conclusion.2 78 In addition to Justice Stevens' statement quoted above, he
also wrote:
Considerations of profound importance counsel restrained
judicial review of the substance of academic decisions ....
Added to our concern for lack of standards is a reluctance to
trench upon the prerogatives of state and local educational
institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their
academic freedom, "a special concern of the First
Amendment." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967). If a "federal court is not the appropriate forum
in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that
are made daily by public agencies," Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 349 (1976), far less is it suited to evaluate the
substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are
made daily by faculty members of public educational
institutions - decisions that require "an expert evaluation of
275

Id. at 225 (internal citations omitted).
227-28.
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 102, at 317. "In 1985, a unanimous Supreme Court

276 Id. at
277

accepted the use of institutional academic freedom in Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing." Id.; see also Brief for Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm, supra note 219, at
9.
278 See infra notes 279-299 and accompanying text.
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cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the
procedural
tools
of
judicial
or
administrative
decisionmaking." Board of Curators, Univ. of Missouri v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89_90.279

Here, Justice Stevens cites Keyishian as if it, perhaps, stood for the idea that
the First Amendment somehow calls on courts to safeguard the academic
freedom of public educational institutions - a misreading of Keyishian
undoubtedly derived from Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion.28 ° Moreover,
it is notable that the quotation from Horowitz refers specifically to "academic
decisions.., made by faculty members of public educational institutions. 28 1
Justice Stevens referred specifically to "the faculty's decision" in the case of
Mr. Ewing, and to the importance of judicial "respect for the faculty's
professional judgment." 282 None of this language suggests that the Court
here held that educational institutions themselves are entitled to academic
freedom under the First Amendment. The Court may have mistakenly
assumed that it had previously so held. But it had not done so. It cannot
seriously be contended that the Supreme Court decides questions of
constitutional
law by mistakenly attributing such decisions to its prior
283
cases.

Justice Stevens added a somewhat peculiar footnote following his
citation to Keyishian.284 This footnote is sometimes cited as a reason for
concluding that the Ewing Court
held that the First Amendment protects
285
institutional academic freedom.

Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students,
see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 603; Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (opinion by
Warren, C.J.), but also, somewhat inconsistently, on
autonomous decision-making by the academy itself, see
University of CaliforniaRegents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312
(1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
279 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26.
280 See supra notes 70, 75-78 and accompanying text.
281 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 (emphasis added).
282 Id. at 225. Whether faculty members should be entitled to academic freedom
protections under the First Amendment when making administrative decisions for public
educational institutions is another question. Since making such decisions arguably constitutes
state or governmental action, it may be doubted whether such protections would or should be
available. See Hiers, supra note 38, at 557-60.
283 Byrne, supra note 194, at 114 n.243 (citing Ewing as one of "the several
Supreme Court opinions after Bakke where the Court affirmed that state universities enjoy
some degree of institutional academic freedom").
284 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12.
285 See Byrne, supra note 102, at 257 n.20; Holland, supra note 136, at 861 n.48.
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354 U.S., at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
Discretion to determine, on academic grounds, who may be
admitted to study, has been described as one of "the four
essential freedoms" of a university. University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S., at 312 (opinion of POWELL, J.)
(quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra, at 263
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)) (internal quotations
omitted).28 6
Justice Stevens correctly cites Keyishian and Sweezy's plurality opinion as
authority for individual faculty academic freedom. 287 He does not, however,
point out that Justice Powell's account of academic freedom derived entirely
from Justice Powell's own redacted reading of Keyishian and from the "four
essential freedoms" language quoted from The Open Universities in Justice
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence.288 Nor did he take the occasion to
observe that Justice Frankfurter's concurrence made no mention of academic
freedom. 289 Justice Stevens' citations to Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion
do not indicate whether he was aware that Justice Powell was not speaking
(or writing) for a majority of the Court.2 9°
At any rate, Justice Stevens said nothing about institutional academic
freedom in this footnote. 29 1 Rather, he referred to "autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself." Academic freedom, he wrote, "thrives" on
both "independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and
students," and "autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself." 292 He
did not identify the role of faculty in such decisionmaking, but, elsewhere in
his opinion, emphasized that the academic decision regarding Mr. Ewing was
made by the institutions' faculty.29 3 Moreover, he did not state here that he
thought such autonomous decision-making was in any way based upon the
First Amendment.294 Perhaps he was thinking of university autonomy as a
286
287
288
289

Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12.
See supra notes 29-30, 43-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70, 75-100 and accompanying text.
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,

90) Ewing, 474 U.S. at 266 n.12. Here Justice Stevens characterizes the plurality
opinion in Sweezy as "opinion of Warren, C.J.," Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence as
"Frankfurter, J., concurring in result," and Justice Powell's solo opinion in Bakke as "opinion
by PowELL, J." (Why only Justice Powell's name is spelled with capital letters is not
explained.)
291 Id.
292
293
294

id.
See supra notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
Necessarily, he did not attempt to explain how institutional autonomy might be

grounded on or protected by the First Amendment. Compare Finkin, supra note 38, at 818
("Institutional autonomy and academic freedom are related but distinct ideas.") with Mincone
v. Nassau County Cmty. Coll., 923 F. Supp. 398, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Justice Stevens
footnote as authority for saying that First Amendment academic freedom "extends both to
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social policy value or state interest to which courts should defer. Justice
Stevens did not explain how he visualized the purported inconsistency
between individual academic freedom and "autonomous decision-making by
the university itself., 295 Perhaps without giving much thought to the matter,
he simply was echoing his former Seventh Circuit colleague, Judge Posner's
characterization of the term "academic freedom" as "equivocal. ' '296
Whatever Justice Stevens may have intended when writing the
language from Ewing quoted above, his comments regarding academic
freedom and autonomous decision-making do not constitute the Court's
holding. The Ewing Court held simply that the University - or more
precisely, the faculty members serving as its Promotion and Review Board,
had made their decision to dismiss Mr. Ewing on the basis of "reasoned
academic" considerations, and, consequently, had not violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to substantive due process. 297 The Ewing case did not
involve any conflict between faculty academic freedom and institutional
autonomy. The Court stated no holding as to either academic freedom 298
Whatever the Ewing
institutional or otherwise - or the First Amendment.
Court may have said about academic freedom, therefore, is dicta.299

educators and institutions."). See also Holland, supra note 136, at 871 n.130 (construing the
footnote as "highlighting law schools' autonomous decision-making as central component of
academic freedom.") It may be mentioned that Ewing did not involve a law school.
295 See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227-28. Justice Stevens statement could be read to
imply some inconsistency between "the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among
teachers and students:" on the one hand, and "autonomous decision making by the academy
itself" on the other. But the more likely meaning is that he believed there could be some
inconsistency or conflict between individual faculty members' academic freedom and
autonomous decisions made by "the university" or "the academy" - leaving open the question
as to whether such decisions might be made by faculty or by administration.
296 As noted, the Court's Ewing decision was announced ten days after the Court
denied certiorari as to Piarowski,in which Judge Posner had pronounced the term "academic
freedom" "equivocal." See supra notes 263, 268 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens may
have assumed that Judge Posner, a respected and learned jurist, had worked out some basis in
constitutional law for that characterization.
297 Ewing, 474 at 227-28. See also Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 236, 238 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)("Ewing addressed not the
relationship between academic freedom and First Amendment burdens imposed by a
university, but a due process challenge to a university's academic decision, while as to them,
the case stopped short of recognizing absolute autonomy. Ewing, supra, at 226 and n. 12.")
Although this language is not entirely pellucid, it does clearly enough state that the Ewing
Court did not decide anything in regard to academic freedom and the First Amendment.
Justice Stevens, who wrote for the Court in Ewing, apparently agreed, since he joined in
Justice Souter's Southworth concurrence.
298 See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); supra notes
267-296 and accompanying text.
299As to the holding-dicta distinction, see Abramowicz & Steams, supra note 214.
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e. And Back to the Seventh Circuit
Judge Posner's language in Piarowskiwas quoted or cited in a few
Seventh Circuit opinions following Ewing, thus indirectly perpetuating the
idea of institutional academic freedom implicit in Justice Powell's Bakke
solo opinion, albeit in a somewhat distorted form.3 ° Seventh Circuit judges,
contemplating supposedly conflicting academic freedoms, typically deferred
to institutional authority. For instance, in Weinstein v. University of Illinois,
the court wrote:
Weinstein invokes 'academic freedom,' but that equivocal
term . . . does not help him. Judicial interference with a
university's selection and retention of30 its
faculty would be an
1
interference with academic freedom.
The clear implication is that, so far as the Seventh Circuit was concerned, an
institution's academic freedom nullifies its faculty's academic freedom, and
that the former amounts to a grant of immunity from judicial review.30 2 Such
Seventh Circuit opinions suggest that, so far as this court is concerned, an
institution's putative entitlement to academic freedom automatically cancels
or outweighs individual faculty academic freedom claims.30 3
Curiously, none of the Seventh Circuit opinions that cite or follow
Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion as authority notes that, as the opinion of
only one Justice, it had no controlling weight. 304 Neither did subsequent
Seventh Circuit panels or judges even begin to explain how administrative
actions by a public university - as a government agency or entity - might be
entitled to protection under the First Amendment. 30 5 Nor did any of the
Supreme Court Justices who later alluded to institutional academic freedom
attempt such justification. 3°

300 See, e.g., infra notes 301-302 and accompanying text.
301

Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1097 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (Opinion by

Easterbrook, J.). Judge Posner was a member of the Weinstein three-judge panel.
302 See also Keen v. Penson, 970 F2d. 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992). The Keen panel
cited both Piarowski and Justice Stevens' Ewing footnote in support of the proposition that
"the asserted academic freedom of a professor can conflict with the academic freedom of the
university to make decisions affecting that professor." Id. at 257. Justice Stevens' Ewing
footnote said nothing about such possible conflict. See supra note 286 and accompanying
text.
303 See also supra notes 249-266 and accompanying text.
304 See supra notes 241-266, 300-303 and accompanying text.
305 See generally Fliers, supra note 38, at 556-568; supra note 102 (comment by
Judge Smith).
306 See supra notes 209-209, 228-240, 267-299 and accompanying text; see infra
notes 307-353 and accompanying text.

INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

2007]

f Justice Souter's Concurrence in Southworth
Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion evidently influenced Justice
Souter's concurring opinion in Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin v. Southworth.3 °7 Here Justice Souter stated:
Our understanding of academic freedom has included not
merely liberty from restraints on thought, expression, and
association in the academy, but also the idea that universities
should have the freedom to make decisions about how and
what to teach....
Some of the opinions in our books emphasize broad
conceptions of academic freedom that if accepted by the
Court might seem to clothe the University with an immunity
to any challenge to regulations made or obligations imposed
in the discharge of its educational mission. °8
Justice Souter did not cite to Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion, but relied
mainly on Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing30 9 and on Justice
31°
Frankfurter's concurring quotation from The Open Universities.
In
contrast to Justice Powell, Justice Souter added, "Our university cases have
dealt with restrictions imposed from outside the academy on individual
teachers' speech and associations., 311 This statement is correct. His earlier
statement that under Supreme Court jurisprudence academic freedom applies
to universities' "decisions about how and what to teach" is not.31 z The
Supreme Court has never so held. Nor did it do so more recently in Grutter
3 13
v. Bollinger.
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236 (2000) (Souter,
J., concurring).
307

308 Id. at 237.

Justice Souter added, however, that the "broad statements on

academic freedom" in Ewing and Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy did not apply
here, among other reasons, because: "Ewing addressed not the relationship between academic
freedom and First Amendment burdens imposed by a university, but a due process challenge
to a university's academic decisions," while "Justice Frankfurter's discussion in Sweezy,
though not rejected, was not adopted by the full Court." Id. at 238.
309Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). Justice Stevens'
suggestions in Ewing as to possible First Amendment protection for institutional academic
freedom derived from Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion, including the latter's reinterpretation of Keyishian. See supra notes 279-280 and 284-290 and accompanying text.
310 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 237-39; see supra notes 24-41
31 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 238 n.4. The cases Justice Souter cited were Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591-92 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236 (1957); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
184-85 (1952).
312 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
313 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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g. Grutterv. Bollinger
Barbara Grutter, who is white, had applied for admission to the
University of Michigan's Law School.3 14 Her application was rejected,
pursuant to the School's special admissions policy, which was designed by a
faculty committee in an effort to "achieve student body diversity." 3 15 She
then sued, and, in due course, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order
to resolve the question "[w]hether diversity is a compelling interest that can
justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission
to public universities. 31 6
Justice O'Connor wrote for the Grutter majority.317
Not
surprisingly, Justice O'Connor turned to Justice Powell's Bakke opinion for
guidance in her analysis of the University of Michigan Law School's
admissions policy, 318 which had been designed to track Justice Powell's
views.3 19
Justice Powell emphasized that nothing less than the
"'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as
this Nation of many peoples." [438 U.S.] at 313 (quoting
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967).32 0
It is unclear whether Justice O'Connor recognized that the quoted language
about "the ideas and mores" of diverse students did not derive from
321
Keyishian, but instead was added by Justice Powell speaking for himself.
She did recognize that Justice Powell's "diversity" rationale was set out in
part of his opinion that was joined by no other Justice.322
However, Justice Powell's Bakke solo opinion evidently misled
Justice O'Connor (and five other Justices) into thinking that Justice
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence and
the Court's opinion in Keyishian had grounded institutional academic
freedom - or, rather, autonomy -- upon the First Amendment:
In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a
compelling interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases
recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded on the
Id. at 316.
Id. at 314-16.
316 Id. at 322.
317 Id. at311.
318 Id. at 322-25, 328-30, 334-37, 339, 341, and 343.
319 Grutter,539 U.S. at 314-15.
314
315

320

Id. at 324.

321

See supra notes 70, 94-95 and accompanying text.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 325.

322
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First Amendment, of educational autonomy: "The freedom
of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body." Bakke, supra, at
312.323
It is important to observe that Justice Powell did not invoke any cases
"recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment,
of educational autonomy., 324 He did not even mention "educational
autonomy," let alone any cases grounding such policy on the Constitution.3 25
326
Instead, he characterized the freedoms in question as "academic freedom.,
Not only courts, but also commentators tend to confuse the concepts of
academic freedom and institutional autonomy. 327
As authority for his statement that "the freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education including the selection of its student
body" was based on the First Amendment, Justice Powell had cited only two
authorities. One was language from The Open Universities quoted in Justice
28
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence. 32832
The other was Keyishian.329 Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence did not ground university "freedoms" on the First
Amendment, nor did his concurrence constitute binding authority.33 ° And
while both Sweezy and Keyishian were concerned with the academic freedom
of teachers, neither said anything at all about educational or institutional
academic freedom or autonomy. 33' Not even in dicta.
Dissenting in Grutter, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
addressed this point. Quoting from Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence
(though mistakenly attributing The Open Universities language to Justice
Frankfurter, himself), Justice Thomas wrote:
According to Justice Frankfurter: 'It is the business of a
university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation....'
In my view, '[i]t is the business' of this Court to explain
itself when it cites provisions of the Constitution to invent
new doctrines - including the idea that the First Amendment
323 Id. at 329. As to Justice Kennedy's similar error, see infra text accompanying

note 325.

324 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
325 Bakke, 438 U.S. 311-19.
326 Id. at 312.

See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Precondition of Educational
Autonomy, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 557 (2003). As aptly observed recently by an astute
commentator, "[clonfusion reigns." Byrne, supra note 194, at 79.
328 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
329 Id. at 312-13. See also supra notes 70-98 and accompanying text.
330 See supra notes 24-41, 138-164 and accompanying text.
331 See supra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
327

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

authorizes a public university to do what would otherwise
violate the Equal Protection Clause. The majority fails in its
summary effort to prove this point. The only source for the
Court's conclusion that public universities are entitled to
deference even within the confines of strict scrutiny is
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Justice Powell, for his
part, relied only on Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy
and the Court's decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967)[.]332
333
The majority was apparently prepared to take Justice Powell's word for it,
notwithstanding Justice Thomas's pointed dissent. Justice Thomas did not
specifically point out that Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy was only a
concurrence, or that neither Sweezy nor Keyishian said anything at all as to
deference to public universities' decision-making authority.334 Clearly,
however, Justice Thomas understood that neither Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Sweezy nor the Keyishian Court had held that public universities
were endowed with First Amendment rights.335
Like the Court's majority, Justice Kennedy also was misled.
Dissenting in Grutter, Justice Kennedy stated "Justice Powell's approval of
the use of race in university admissions reflected a tradition, grounded in the
First Amendment, of acknowledging a university's conception of its
educational mission. [Bakke], at 312-314, ante, at 329. ' '336 There was no
"tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a
university's conception of its educational mission." Understandably, Justice
Kennedy cited no cases that might constitute such a tradition, for there were
no such cases337
Neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Kennedy even attempted to
explain how a public university might be entitled to a First Amendment right
to select students for admission - or for any other purpose. 338 Of course,

332 Grutter,539 U.S. at 363 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
333 Id. at 329.
334Justice Thomas' discussion of both Keyishian and Justice Frankfurter's opinion

in Sweezy is found at Grutter,539 U.S. at 362-64.
335See supra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
336 Grutter,539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
337Id. As authority, Justice Kennedy cited the majority's similarly mistaken
assertion. See id. at 329.
338 For instance, neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Kennedy cited any authority
for the novel presumption that a public university, a state agency, was a "person." Both the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply explicitly and
only to persons. The First Amendment was first applied to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Court has not yet held
that public universities are persons for purposes of the due process clause. Arguably, private
colleges and universities might so qualify since First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978) held that corporations could be considered "persons" with respect to the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. However, private educational institutions are not necessarily
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neither had any need to do so. Judges and Justices writing dicta are free to
elaborate their own views without grounding them on constitutional or
statutory authority. Justice O'Connor's references to what she thought
Justice Powell had said in Bakke about First Amendment protection for
academic freedom or educational autonomy clearly are dicta.C Likewise,
dissenting opinions may merely express the dissenters' ideas about what the
law should be. Such references do not constitute propositions actually
decided by the GrutterCourt. 34
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that lower federal courts were
divided as to whether Justice Powell's "diversity rationale, set forth in part of
[his] opinion joined by no other Justice, [was] nonetheless binding precedent
under Marks. 34 1 She also recognized that the Court was not bound by
Justice Powell's diversity rationale, which may or may not have attempted to
draw support from some kind of theory as to First Amendment institutional
academic freedom. 342 Instead, Justice O'Connor stated:
We do not find it necessary to decide whether Justice
Powell's opinion is binding under Marks. It does not seem
"useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical
possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the
lower courts that have considered it." Nichols v. United
States, supra, at 745-746. . . . More important, for the
reasons set out below, today we endorse Justice Powell's
view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest
343
that can justify the use of race in university admissions.

corporations, even though their governing boards may be. For example, the Yale Corporation
is not Yale University. As to arguments for extension of First Amendment academic freedom
to religious colleges and universities, see James D. Gordon, 111, Individual and Institutional
Academic Freedom at Religious Colleges and Universities,30 J. C. & U. L. 1 (2003).
39 539 U.S. 324, 329. As noted supra text accompanying notes 60-75, Justice
Powell's Bakke solo opinion attempted to ground institutional academic freedom - not
autonomy - on the First Amendment.
340 As to the distinguishing marks of dicta, see Abramowicz & Steams, supra note
198.
34' Grutter,539 U.S. at 325; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
343 Grutter,539 U.S. at 325. Commentators who favor the concept of institutional
academic freedom have struggled in order to extract support from Grutter. See, e.g., various
statements in Byrne, supra note 194, at 116-118, 121. "'[T]he compelling' quality of the
university's interest stems from First Amendment protection for the autonomy of good faith
educational decision making." Id. at 116. "The logic of Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court required that great weight be placed upon institutional academic freedom to make the
case that student body racial diversity amounts to a compelling interest." Id. "The point is
clear: creating a diverse student body is a compelling state interest because institutional
academic freedom requires deference to the college's or university's judgment that such a
class furthers educational goals." Id. at 117. "But in the clinch, Grutterjustifies the weight it
affords educational autonomy only by quoting Powell in Bakke." Id. at 118. "The logic of the

54
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The Grutter majority, applying strict scrutiny, determined that the
University of Michigan Law School's race-based admissions program was
"necessary to further a compelling governmental interest," was narrowly
tailored, and therefore did not violate Ms. Grutter's right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 " Justice O'Connor listed a wide range
of "benefits" that "bolstered" the "Law School's claim of a compelling
interest., 345 Most of those benefits had been articulated in the numerous
amici briefs submitted on its behalf, not by the School.34 Curiously, none of
these benefits or interests was identified as a state interest. 347 Some were
said to be interests of the Law School; the others were described in terms of
their contributions to the Nation as a whole, namely, American business, the
Nation's military needs, American society and culture, and providing a
"visibly open" pathway to emerging national leadership.348 These benefits
and interests were, in effect, broad social or public policy values.
Though citing Justice Powell's invocation of earlier cases, which she
said recognized "a constitutional dimension, grounded on the First
Amendment, of educational autonomy," Justice O'Conner did not factor
either educational autonomy or the First Amendment into her account of the
"compelling" interests which, she implied, outweighed Grutter's Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection right.34 9 Instead, she wrote:
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling
interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view
that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the

Court's doctrinal argument requires that academic freedom have [constitutional status], even
if Justice O'Connor's opinion only stingily gives it rhetorical support." Id. at 121.
'44 Grutter,539 U.S. at 326, 344. The Court also found no violation of Title VI or
42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 344. For a scathing account of Justice Powell's diversity rationale in
Bakke and its application in the Grutter Court's analysis, see Lino A. Graglia, Grutter and
Gratz: Race Preference to IncreaseRacial Representation Held "Patently Unconstitutional"
Unless Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing Diversity, 78 ThL. L. REV. 2037 (2004).
345 Grutter,539 U.S. at 330 (emphasis added).
346 Id. at 329-33.
147 See id. at 330-333.
348 Id. See Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You've Got to Have Friends: Lessons
Learnedfrom the Role of Amici in the University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503
(2004).
349 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion does not attempt
to "weigh" or evaluate the relative importance of the Law School's interest and Ms. Grutter's
constitutional right.
Instead, having concluded that the Law School's interest was
"compelling," the majority apparently assumed without analysis that interest superior to Ms.
Grutter's right to equal protection. The majority stated in conclusion, "[in summary, the
Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body." Id. at 343. Cf Graglia, supra note 344, at 2046,
commenting on Justice O'Connor's analysis in Grutter. "The Equal Protection Clause has
been made to disappear!" Id.
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Law School's proper institutional mission, and that "good
faith" on the part of a university is "presumed"0 absent "a
showing to the contrary." 438 U.S. at 318-319.35

Nor did the Grutter majority propose that the Law School had a First
Amendment right to autonomy (or academic freedom) that off-set in any way
Ms. Grutter's equal protection claim. The Court simply concluded - without
engaging in any reported "balancing" - that the various state or governmental
interests implicated in the School's admissions program were more important
than that equal protection right. The First Amendment did not enter into the
equation.35 1 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion cited Justice Powell's
Bakke solo opinion as authority for the proposition that a university enjoys a
constitutional, namely, First Amendment, right or interest in educational
autonomy, but her opinion makes no holding to that effect.352
Significantly, Justice O'Connor's characterization of the Court's
holding does not refer to any First Amendment basis for deference to
institutional autonomy. Instead, she wrote:
Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no
less strict for taking into account complex educational
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise
of the university. Our holding today is in keeping with our
tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's
academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed
3 53
limits.
U.S. at 329.
351 See Kathy L. Wyer, Comment, A Most Dangerous Experiment? University
Autonomy, Academic Freedom, and the Concealed-WeaponsControversy at the University of
Utah, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 983, 1008 n.139 (2003) (reading Grutter's holding as based on
"constitutional academic freedom"). Another commentator observed, "[tihe order and
allocation of proof was not explained in Justice O'Connor's opinion." Leland Ware, Strict
Scrutiny, Affirmative Action, and Academic Freedom: The University of Michigan Cases, 78
TULANE L. REV. 2097, 2109 (2004). Nevertheless, Ware proposes: "Relying on academic
freedom principles, the majority accorded considerable deference to the university's
educational judgments concerning the value of student body diversity." Id. at 2098-99. See
also id. at 2105 ("Invoking principles of academic freedom, the majority accorded
considerable deference to the university's 'complex educational judgments' concerning the
educational benefits of student body diversity."); id. at 2109 ("[T]he majority in Grutter
invoked academic freedom principles and accorded a presumption of validity to the
university's claims concerning the value of diversity."). Ware does not discuss or mention
any First Amendment basis for or connection with such "academic freedom principles." It
would be more accurate to say that to some extent the Court deferred to the university's policy
out of respect for institutional autonomy. See supra note 323 and accompanying text; see
infra note 353 and accompanying text. The Grutter majority nowhere mentions "academic
freedom principles."
352 Grutter,539 U.S. at 329. See Byrne, supra. note 343.
133 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. See generally Edward N. Stoner II & J. Michael
Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational Judgment: Justice O'Connor's Opinion in
350 Grutter,539
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Nothing is said here about institutional academic freedom or autonomy.
Instead, the majority states that it was simply "giving a degree of deference"
to academic autonomy. To so state does not constitute a determination that
academic institutions are entitled to academic freedom or autonomy under
the First Amendment. The Grutter Court opinion contains no holding as to
institutional academic freedom, institutional autonomy, or the First
Amendment.
Perhaps at some point the Supreme Court will address directly the
question whether colleges and universities are so entitled. If or when that
happens, the Court will have to decide whether the Constitution really does
provide adequate underpinnings for institutional autonomy or academic
freedom.3 54 To date, it has not even attempted to do so.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Since 1978, several judges, Justices and commentators have declared
that the First Amendment somehow under-girds the academic freedom or
autonomy of public colleges and universities.355 They did so because they
believed that at some point, the Supreme Court already had so held.356
Various Justices have so stated in concurring opinions and in some cases
Court majorities seem to have agreed in dicta that universities or their
professional schools are entitled to academic freedom or autonomy based
upon the First Amendment.35 7 But the Supreme Court has never held that
public colleges and universities are entitled to either academic freedom or
institutional autonomy under the First Amendment. Nor has any judge,
Justice or commentator explained how institutional academic freedom or
autonomy could be grounded upon the First Amendment. To do so would
require addressing several constitutional considerations, some of which are
only mentioned here. For instance, the First Amendment protects speech and
association, not state action, whether in the form of policy-making or
administrative decision. Also, it protects the rights of individual persons
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in the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J.C. & U.L. 583 (2004).
354 As to these issues, see supra note 338 and accompanying text and Hiers, supra
note 38, at 556-68.
355 See supra notes 112-352 and accompanying text.
356 Id.
357 Judges and Justices usually do not dissent, concur or concur specially if they

happen to disagree with dicta penned by the writing judge or Justice, so long as they are in
agreement as to the results and the basic legal reasoning leading to it. Special concurrences
generally are written only if the concurring judge or Justice reaches the same result by
applying significantly different legal theories, and particularly wishes to call such theories into
question. Therefore, the fact that judges or Justices seem to "agree" in dicta does not provide
a basis for predicting how they would decide if the matter were later fully briefed and argued
before the Court. There is an important difference between agreeing in dicta, on one hand,
and articulating a reasoned holding on the other.
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from governmental intrusion, not the rights - if any - of government or
governmental agencies from constitutional claims by individual persons.
The Court has never held that the First Amendment protects government
speech. Nor has it ever held that public colleges and universities are persons
for purposes of First and Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
The rather remarkable pattern of confusion traced in this article
largely dates and derives from Justice Powell's solo opinion in Bakke.
There, Justice Powell fused Keyishian's language affirming the importance
of First Amendment academic freedom for teachers with Justice
Frankfurter's concurring quotation in Sweezy from The Open Universities
about the "four essential freedoms of the university." Later courts and
commentators sometimes confused so-called institutional academic freedom
with institutional autonomy. And several have confused concurrences and
dicta in earlier cases with holdings by the Court. It is not necessary to decide
to what extent any of the particular instances described in this article might
be characterized as intentional misrepresentations rather than simply as
The Supreme Court does not decide
misreadings of prior cases.
constitutional law questions by mistakenly assuming that it had already ruled
on those questions sometime in the past. Fictitious or phantom precedents do
not constitute constitutional law. Judges and Justices must relate their
interpretations of the Constitution to the text of the Constitution, not simply
to what they think the Court once may have said.
Thus, it may be concluded that the Court has never held that
educational institutions themselves are entitled to academic freedom under
the First Amendment. The notion that the Court has so held may be aptly
characterized as a jurisprudential mirage. Once approached and viewed up
close, it vanishes.
To be sure, public colleges and universities may have an obligation
to provide the kind of atmosphere where First Amendment academic
freedom can flourish. 358 Arguably, as "expressive association," academic
institutions may invoke First Amendment academic freedom protections on
behalf of their faculty and students.359 Courts may certainly defer to the
358 It is noteworthy that The Open Universities language quoted by Justice
Frankfurter in his Sweezy concurrence states that it is "the business of a university to provide
that atmosphere" where its "essential freedoms" can "prevail." See supra note 34 and
accompanying text. Justice Powell properly indicated that a university's seeking to promote
"the 'robust exchange of ideas"' involves a "First Amendment interest." See supra note 70
and accompanying text. But the First Amendment interest is that of those engaged in free
speech on the campus, not that of the university itself.
359 Recently, the Court wrote in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights
126 S.Ct 1297, 1312-12 (2006)("We have recognized a First Amendment right to associate for
the purpose of speaking, which we have termed a 'right of expressive association."') See. e.g.,
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). The reason we have extended First
Amendment protection in this way is clear: The right to speak is often exercised most
effectively by combining one's voice with the voices of others. See Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). If the government were free to restrict individuals' ability
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expert judgment of academicians, or even recognize institutional autonomy
"within constitutionally prescribed limits" whether as a matter of sound
public policy or as an important state interest. 36
But none of these
propositions is the same as saying that colleges, universities or their
professional schools, themselves, are entitled to the enjoyment of either
academic freedom or autonomy under the First Amendment.
First Amendment protection for institutional academic freedom or
institutional autonomy might be beneficial, as some cases and commentators
have forcibly contended. 6
Such protection, however, could have
deleterious consequences, as some lower court decisions have demonstrated
and other commentators have suggested.3 62 This article does not take a
position as to the possible advantages or disadvantages of First Amendment
protection of these interests. Its simply concludes that the Supreme Court
has never held that the First Amendment accords such protections.

to join together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the First Amendment is
intended to rotect. Ibid." Rumsfeld, at 126 S.Ct. at 311-12.
360 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). A commentator recently has
suggested that courts "might defer to institutional academic freedom even where it restricted
individual academic freedom" if the hate speech codes in question were necessary to deter
serious harm to victims. Timothy C. Shiell, 'Three Conceptions of Academic Freedom" in
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE DAWN OF A NEW CENTURY 31 (Evan Gerstmann and Matthew J.
Streb, eds., 2006).
361 See, e.g., supra note 255 and accompanying text (protecting peer review
processes); see also Wyer, supra note 351 and Ware, supra note 351 (respectively urging
university autonomy as a basis for controlling guns on campus, and institutional academic
freedom as basis for defending affirmative action and student diversity).
362 See, e.g., supra note 194 (comments on Urofsky) and supra note 251 (quoting
Finkin). See also Paul Horwitz, Grutter's FirstAmendment," 46 B.C.L. Rev. 461 (2005)
(suggesting alternative readings of Grutter and noting numerous potentially positive and
negative implications as to each).

